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Abstract
Anticipated post-innovation collusion encourages R&D effort, but realized collusion later yields deadweight
losses. In balancing this trade-off, Bertrand industries sometimes outperform Cournot; sometimes not. Both
usually out perform perfectly collusive industries. The optimal level of collusion is often less collusive than
Cournot duopoly...
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Abstract
Anticipated post-innovation collusion encourages R&D effort, but realized collusion later
yields deadweight losses. In balancing this trade-ofF, Bertrand industries sometimes outper
form Cournot; sometimes not. Both usually outperiform perfectly collusive industries. The
optimal level of collusion is often less collusive than Cournot duopoly.
In Bertrand industries, too few firms do R&D. The same goes for long-shot or high cost
projects in all industries. However, in perfectly collusive industries, too many firms invest
when a project has medium to high chances of success. Investment by Cournot industries is
often close to optimal.
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I. Introduction
In deciding whether ,to undertake R&D to.develop a new product, a firm must.consider
thecost of doing reseaxch, the probability of succeeding,,^d the likel>^ degree of,competition
in the new market. In this paper, I study how these three factors influence both the number
of firms which attempt R&D and the expected welfare performance of the industry.
For the most part, the paper focuses on. the c^e where effective, patent protection is
unavailable but where imitation is not.jmmediate.^ Thus, the new product may be produced
by all,firms succeeding at research, but only by those firms.. This important case has also
been studied by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980, Sec.II(2)), Tandon.(1984), and Sail and Stiglitz
I . ' , I"• -I, . ^ • , 1,.^^ - "j ' . . .'l , y . I r. '
(1987). While most of theseearlier efforts have examined only onedegree or another, ofpost-
innovation competition in isolation, the present paper simultaneously treats a wide rcmge
of conduct from competition to perfect collusion. This approach allows us to see how the
anticipated degree of post^innovation competition among the R&D "winners" affects ex ante
expected social welfare and the levelof innovative activity.
The connection between competition and R&D of course dates back to Schumpeter.
The anticipation of post-innovation profits is what induces a firm to undertake R&D. More
post-innovation collusion means higher realiz^ profits, the anticipation _pf which in turn in-
duces more firms to do R&D. However, this,higher R&D effort ^co^es only at the expense of
higher deadweight losses in the post-innovation market. In a classic.Schumpeterian trade-off,
"static" efficiency in pricing is thus sacrificed to get more "dynamic" efficiency in techno
logical advancement. The key question is the proper balance between the two: how much
collusion is optimal?
The evidence developed in this paper suggests thathigh levels ofcollusion do not generally
produce the highest levels ofexpected welfare. For instance, among Bertrand, Coumot, and
perfectly collusive (i.e., joint profit maxinuzing) industries, Bertrand and especia^y Cournot
^Section 8 considers the effects ofpatent protection.
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usually outperform perfect collusion and often by a wide margin. More generally, for a
project with a given success probability and research cost, there is, over the full range of
oligopoly behavior, a single optimal level of ex post collusion, and that level is independent
of the number of firms which actually produce. An example suggests that the optimal level
of collusion is less than that exhibited by a Cournot duopoly, except for projects with verv
high costs or very low success probabilities.
Another important question is whether too few or too many firms undertake R&D, given
the existing level ofindustry collusion and the research costs and probabilities. This question
is ofpolicy as well as of theoretical interest, since special tax credits, depreciation rules, and
direct subsidies are occasionally proposed as ways of encouraging more firms to undertake
R&D.
In a Bertrand industry, the results show that, in fact, fewer firms do R&D than would be
optimal, ceteris paribus. Indeed, for high cost and low probability projects in general, too
few firms invest, whatever the degree of industry collusion. In a perfectly collusive industry,
however, for all but those low probability and high cost projects, expected welfare would be
raised by rtducing the number of firms doing R&D. With a Cournot industry, there may
be too few firms investing or too many or just the right number, depending on the project
parameters. However, the welfare losses due to under- or overinvesting are usually modest
for a Cournot industry.
In addition to looking at a wide rcinge of competition, this paper also studies the full
range of uncertainty from a long shot to a sure thing. The results show that the probability
of research success affects both the number of firms doing R&D and the expected welfare
performance—but that the effects are sometimes in counterintuitive directions. For insteince,
an increase in success probability may actually cause fewer firms to undertake R&D. An
increjLse in success probability may also cause expected welfare to decrease, whether the
number of firms doing R&D rises or falls.
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,The iprobability effects are again ofpractical as'well"as theoretical interest, since various
.government polici^ can also influence theiprobability-^of research success.' For example,
enacting environmental protection requirements and product safety standards may reduce
the probability of successful commercial research,,while sponsoring basic research-may do
the reverse. ^ . , - -
• Finally, with reg^d, to patents, it is demonstrated that the availaibility of patent protec-
..Uon dp^'.not always jncrease,firms'.incentives to dotR&D-r^and does not necessarily improve
expected welfare even when it does incre^e.RijD effort. rXhe results suggest that the avail-
.ability of patent-prptectiqn is morei likely to increaise R&D incentives for new technologies
^ w:ith.incre^ing returns-in .production-than. for. technologies with decreasing returns; in this
. sense,, leg^ monopoly nriay, beget^natural monopoly. Oh the.other hand, patent-availability
, is more Hkely to..</ecrec5e-R^p incentive in highly coUusive Jndustries; a >legal-monopoly
added to a "behavioral monopoly"-,can,actuallyicausetfewer firins to .do research. '
"^he paper.is organized m follows. Sectipnjll specifies.the R&D model.and the equilibrium
conpepts.j Section III compares the exp,ected;welfare performanceof.Bertirand, Coiirnot, and
perfecUy collusive industries. Certain anomalies are found concerning the effects onexpected
welfareof ch^ging,the success probability.: Section, III also addresses the issue oftheoptimal
- degr^ of collusion. -Section IV exai]^|M-theprobability on the number of firms
- which do,R&p. Section looks at .whether the;nuniber:of firms which do,R&D is optimal,
given the level of competition. Section VI.uses the i^ults of Sections IV. andV to examine
the effect of success prbbabjU£y'and rraearcl^^ ,pn.e^efited.welfare.,and,Jn particular, to
explain the ^oixiali^ ofS.^tion III. Finally, Section Vnconsiders mixed strategy, equilibria,
Section VIII ojvers patents/^d Section IX cond^^ , \'.v . jr-
II. •• ThiB'Model••'•f;-:-,:
The R&D model two stag^. -.At the .beginning-of the first stage,^ an idea for a
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new product appears. This idea is assumed to be available to all firms which might wish to
develop the new product. For instance, the idea might come from a publication in a scientific
journal. In the first stage, each (risk-neutral) firm decides whether to launch its own lUiD
effort and, if so, undertakes the necessary research.
In the second stage, the firms which have succeeded at research produce the new product
and reap the corresponding profits in the market. As explained in the introduction, I consider
here the case where, in order to use the new technology, a firm must have successfully
completed its own research; i.e., where imitation is as difficult as original research. The
class of innovations for which this is true is empirically significant.^ Until Section 8, I will
also assume that effective patent protection is unavailable, implying that all firms successful
at research can produce.^ At the end of the second stage, it is assumed that the new
technology becomes public knowledge (or, alternatively, is superseded by a yet newer product
innovation), so that there are no further profits to be earned from it.
To undertake a given project, a firm bears aone-time, fixed research expenditure R, With
that expenditure, a firm "buys" a probability t ofresearch success. The probabilities are the
same for all firms doing research and are independent among firms. This fixed-cost, fixed-
probability model of research facilitates a comparative static analysis of how probabilities and
costs affect performance, yet it loses little in the way ofgenerality. Under certain reasonable
conditions, it can beshown that, even if R&D expenditures and probabilities were variable,
'For instance, Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) found that, of 28 major innovations (i.e., ones
costing over $1 million) in chemicals, drugs, electronics, and machinery, imitation costs were between 80%
and 100% oftheoriginal innovation costs for six innovations and exceeded 100% for five more. Similar figures
were found comparing imitation time with the time needed for the original innovation.
^Besides the obvious case in which the government simply does not offer patent protection, my model
captures several other reasonable scenarios, at least in their limiting cases. Dasgupta and StigUtz (1980,
Section 11(2)) also look at the case without patenting. As they suggest, the analysis also applies to the case
where the firms successful at research produce products which are perfect substitutes in consumption and
have similar costs but whose technologies are patentably different. This is the limiting case of innovation
with differentiated products. My analysis also applies when innovating firms choose not to request patent
protection, as, for instance, when the information that would have to be disclosed on a patent application
would allow other firms—even ones that had not done reseairch—to "invent around" the patent quickly and




aU firms would in equilibrium spend the same'amount and get the same probability and that
the expenditure amount would be determined by the research technology only/ hbt 'by the
number of firms doing research, nor by the\degree of collusion, nor by any other factor.^
Let N be the number of firms which undertake research and n the number which succeed.
In the second stage, these n firms face an inverse demand curve for the new product given
by P(Q)i where Q is total output. Under the new technology, firm fc's cost of producing
output qie is C(gfc). Both P{Q) and the corresponding marginal revenue curve, MR(Q), are
i ^ . 1 . ^f,,(\ 'I • iJ ' '•'» "1 ~ •
assumed to be strictly negatively sloped, and marginal costs are nondecreasing in output.®
I further assume that demand is bounded above for all positive prices.
f . f ,
I I , \ ' r " J
The degree of competition exhibited by the n firms in the post-innovation market is
{ : 'i. ' I "Ci'J • ''u--
of central concern here. The focus will be on symmetric solutions in general and on the
Bertrand, Cournot, and joint profit maximizing solutions in particular. For expositional
^ > . •. .. "."i',' 1. • 0
^If Tand.R were vuiable, then.we could presumably, construct'^ a Unction R= R(r) capturing the cost R
of achieving a success probability r, with ofcourse Rf{T) > 0. The "reasonable conditions'* then include free
entry into the research s^ge and ^ "average-c66t'''Curve,f^i2(T)/r,'.with a U-shape. The natiiral equilibrium
can then be shown to equate "average" and "marginal" costs, so that r and R(r) would bedetermined solely
by i2'(r) = R{^t)/t. See,-for exaxnple, Tandon (1983,.Section;3', p^l61). Although Tandon*s formulation is
for a model with patenting, a similar argument is easilymade for the-case here; — . . . _
Sah and Stiglitz (1987).^and Reynolds and Isaac (1990) have also examined an' lUcD model in' which the
expenditure per project similarly depends'only on'^ th'e'research technology. Indeed, the expenditure is again
the amount which equates the marginal and, average returns. (See, for instance, equation (8) in Sah and
Stiglitz (1987, p.102).).'Their model differs/however, in"tHat each firm may undertake multiple research
projects. -Thus, their result is a bit like firms having multiple plants, with each plant'producing at the
minimum point of a U-shaped p/ant average 'cost curve, while Tandon*s (1983) case and the case alluded to
here aremore like the situation in which free entry forces each firm to produce at the bottom ofa U-shaped
jfrm average cost curve. •
The one-project*per-firm model which I use is b^ed implicitly on ^ assumption that to bring a new
product succe^uUy to market requires theiefforts of the entire firm, including prodiicUon, marketing, dis
tribution, wdisalesj and not just r^arch. For tbis:ca9e,-it seeiiu difficult'to think of a firm undertaking
multiple independent projects. ^ ' . r , , . . .
^TheM assumptions are sufficient for second order conditions to hold simultaneously across' the full range
of oligopoly solutions to be studied below. Less 'restrictive a^umptiohs can be u^d for p^ticular mar
ket solutions; for instance, the slope of the muginal revenue..curve is obviously irrelevant in the perfectly
competitive case.
D^pite-having nonnegatiyely sloped.marginal'costsj a cost function may.nevertheless exhibit increasing
returns over a range of output, if for instance there are sufficiently positive fixed costs. To the extent that
observations areoffered below on increasing returns cases, such remarks should beunderstood to apply only
to the subset of increasing returns cost functions which meetfthese .assumptions. • •<
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convenience, all ofthese solutions can be presented in a unified notation.® Let firm k choose
output qk to maximize profits qt •P(Q) - In a symmetric solution/ its choice qk
(=Q/n) can be represented "as if" firm A: were solving the first order condition
• (1 - ,5). P{Q) +^ .MR{Q) - C'{Q/n) = 0 (1)
for an appropriate value of 0. For instance, a perfectly competitive firm would satisfy (1) if
^ = 0. For joint profit maximizing (or "perfect") collusion, the appropriate value would be
Pj{n) =1for all n.® For the synunetric Cournot solution, the value would be® 0c{^) —1/n.
If the cost function had constant returns, the Bertrand values wpuld be 0B{n) = 1forn = 1
and = 0 for n > 1. (Subscripts By C, and J will be used throughout to refer to the
Bertrand, Cournot, and joint profit maximizing cases, respectively.)
We can interpret in general as the degree of collusion in the industry. Since a higher
^ in (1) generates a lower Qand a higher a higher value of 0 corresponds to greater
collusion. With ^ = 0 representing pe^ect competition and 0 = \ representing perfect
collusion, [0,1] would seem to be the range of reasonable 0 values.
As in the Bertrand and Cournot cases, p may in general depend on In the tradi-
Similar notation has been employed in anumber ofcomparative static analyses of imperfectly competitive
industries. See, for instance, Dbdt (1986), Katz and Rosen (1985), Quirmbach (1982, 1984, and 1988), Seade
(1983), and other examples cited byDixit.
''If the cost function exhibits increasing returns, it may not be possible for all nRA:D "winners" to produce
Md still sustain nonnegative profits, especially ifthere is little collusion. For such cases, I will assume that
just enough firms produce so as to drive profits to zero. Outputs of the n firms will not be symmetric in this
case, but their profits will be.
®When costs exhibit increasing returns, true joint profit maximization would require that only one firm
produce. However, I am assuming here that side payments among firms are not an option, so that each of
the n firms must actually produce in order tosecure a positive reward for its RisD success. In increasing
returns cases, ^^oint profit maximization" should thus be understood as conditional on all firms producing.
For the class ofincreasing returns cost functions thatwill be considered here—see footnote 5 in the previous
paragraph—the first order conditions for this constrained optimization are indeed satisfied by 0j{n)= 1.
^Cournot firm k*s first order condition would be
P(Q) + 9fP'((?)-C'(?i) = 0.
At the symmetric solution, = Q/n. Thensetting0 = 1/n in the second term and using MR= P + Q•P'
yields (1).
^°See Lemma 1 later in this section.
^^For convenience, within any given industry, 0 will be assumed to depend only on n. 0 for instance will
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tional terminology, 0 repr^ents industry, "conduct" while n represents "structure." For the
general case, I will assume, in line with'the conventional wisdom, that the function /?(n)
is nonincreasing in n for any given industry; that is,, that the industry does not behave
less competitively as the number of producers incre^es. Unless .otherwise noted, /(3(1) = 1
will be assumed for all industries: a monopoly is a monopoly. •The Bertrand, joint profit
maMnuzing, and symmetric Cournot cases all meet ^these requirements..
Between industries, the more ;collusive can be.distinguish^ from the more competitive
by comparing their, ^(n) schedules. If /?G(n) captures .the outcome of industry G and ^^(n)
the outcome of.industry then we will say that industry G is "more collusive" ("more
competitive") than industry H if'/3c;,(n) > (<) Pniv) for For example, a joint
profit maximizing industry is more collusive than a Cournot industry, which in turn is more
collusive than a Bertrand industry.
In summary, for any n, a firm*s reward in the second stage is given by the function
7r(n, ^(n)), representing the,ex post realized profits per firm:
• ,r(n,^(n)) = P(g)-(<3/Ti)-(7((3/n), ^ (2)
'V
where Q = Q{n^{n)) is the solution to (1). For n = 0, let Q(0,y5) =,7r(0,j5) = 0.
In the first stage, firms decidewhether to invest in R&Ddn-the basis of expected profits. I
assume that at the research stage firms correctly anticipate that realized profits will be given
by (2) for whatever n is realized. Let jB7r(7V, r,^(n)) be the expected profits per firm gross
of R&D costs. Since all N firms doing resezirch are symmetric^y situated, the expected
profits of each are l/N times the industry expectedprofits. With p/Cn = ^!/[n!(yV —n)!],
ET(N,T,P{n)) = I'. -T" •(1 - .•x(n,^(n)). (3)
n=0
One can consider the first-stage in isolation as a separate game, with the payofffor a firm
not depend on Q, r, or R. As before, less restrictive but messier assumptions wiU also do. When convenience




being Eiri^Nj t, ^(m)) —i2 ifit invests and zero ifit does not. The equilibria examined below
will in general be the subgcune perfect equilibria of this first stage game. If the second stage
is Cournot or Bertrand, then the result is a subgame perfect equilibrium for the two-stage
game in the corresponding strategy space.
Twoscenarios for the specific timingof first stage investment decisions will be considered:
sequential moves and simultaneous moves. If firms decide simultaneously, each firm makes
its own investment decision before learning any of the decisions of the other firms. With
sequential moves, no two firms decide at the same instant, and each firm's decision becomes
known before the next firm comes to decide. Note that it is not necessary in the sequential
scenario for the sequence of decisions among the firms to be preordained. For example, it
could be that the idea for the research project reaches firms according to &Poisson process;
that each firm makes its decision as soon as the idea reaches it; and that it quickly publicizes
its decision.^^
When decisions are made sequentially in the first stage, there is a (generically) unique
subgame perfect equilibrium, and it is in pure strategies, as follows. As the research idea
becomes more widely available, each firm in the sequence commits to investing, causing
expected profit (3) to fall.^^ The generically unique equilibrium N is reached and no further
^^Indeed, given that the RicD idea will eventually become known to a large number of firms, and given
that T, R, and the post-innovation profit function (2) are common knowledge to the firms which, know ofthe
idea, it is then the case that once a firm commits to investing it has every incentive to announce its decision
so as to deter other firms from investing later on.
It is further assumed in the sequential timing setting that the length of time over which the sequence of
decisions occurs b short relative to the amount of time necessary to do the research. Thus, !'*ms which
decide earlier gain no research advantage over those which decide later.
^®To see that (3) decreases in N, first rearrange (3) to give
s
Ex(N, r,p{n)) = r •J]) •r""' •(1 - r)""" •ir(n,/3(n));
n=l
that is, r times a single firm's conditional expected profit, where the conditioning ison the firm's own success
and where the expectation is taken over its rivals' research .results. Then, £x(y^,r,^(n)) can be shown to
decrease in ^ by a first order stochastic dominance argument (Hanoch and Levy, (1969)), provided that
fl'(n,^(n)) decreases in n for n > 1. This latter is shown in Lemma 1 below. It is a straightforward exercise
(Quirmbach, 1982) to show that, under our assumptions, (3) converges to zero as N gets large.
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firms invest when^^ • ,
.' ' . • J * • / i . 11. '
... En(N,T,0{n))>R>-Ex(N + l,T,§{n)), • (4)
- f
Let Nx be the equilibrium number'of firms given'by '(4) wlien 0(n) = I3x(n); thus, Nb^ Nc,
and Nj will be the equilibritini numbers of firms for the BertrisLnH, Coiirnot, and joint profit
maximizing cases, respectively* Gfcourse, Nx = 0 if r •7r(l,^jf(i)) < R.
Iffirms move simultaneously in the first stage, then there is (generically) onepure strategy
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, and it involves the same equilibrium N as m the
sequential move case.^® However, if the pure strategy equilibrium involves, a positive N,
then the simultaneous move formulation also has mixed strate^ equilibria. Indeed, it turns
out that there are countably infinitely many such equilibria.
The focus ofmost of the paper will be on the pure strategy equilibrium outcomes common
to the sequential and simultaneous move formulations. The mixed strategy equilibria of the
simultaneous move case are dealt with in Section 7. ,
Realizedwelfare in the second stage is the sum of consumer surplus plus operating profit:
where
WXn,0(n)) = CS{n,0{n))-\-n-iT{n,0(n)), ' >• (5)
. ".t -• "V
, '• \ f
VI - - .L , fQ "Cs\n;0in]) =jy(q)dq'-:P{Q)..Q, / . (6)
and Q = (J(n,^(n)). For n = 0, let = C5(0,^)" ==' 0. The expected welfare
performance of the ^tire R&D process is equal to_the exp^ted value of realized welfare
^^If = Aexactly, then both N and (^—1) firms investing would be pure strategy equilibria.
In that knife-edge case, there would alsobe mixed strategy equilibria.
'^Multiple pure strategy equilibria exist, but'theydiffer only in the identities of theN firms which invest.
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minus research costs, with all values in constant dollars:^®
-iV-R (7)
\naO /
Many of the results which follow require only the general demand and cost restrictions
above, namely P' < 0 and MR' < 0 < C". These results will be identijied as being from
theGeneral Demand-General Cost or GDGC model. Some useful bctsic relationships for this
model are presented in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. /n the GDGC model:
(i) Fij n and vary ^ independently (e.g., as between two industries). Then, total output
Q{ny0) is strictly decreasing in for 0 € [0,1]. Realized social welfare W(n,0) is
also decreasing in and strictly so for > 0, while realized firm profits 7r{n^j3) are
increasing in and strictly so for 0 < I.
(ii) Ifnis varied and if 0 is nonincreasing in n, then total output Q{n^0(n)) is increasing
in n and strictly so unless 0 is constant with respect to n and marginal costs are
fiat. Profit per firm, T(n,/3(n)), is nonincreasing in n; it is strictly decreasing unless
/3(n) H 0 and C"{q) = 0 over the relevant ranges. Asfor industry profits, n'7r(n^ 0(n)),
J[n-^(n.^(n))] ^J ^ .q.
where AC{q) = C{q)lq. Thus, realized industry profits are locally decreasing in n, for
1| if the new technology exhibits locally increasing returns. Industry profits are also
locally decreasing in n if the technology has constant returns, 0{n) < 1, and 0{n) is
strictly decreasing in n. If producers are perfectly collusive (i.e., if 0(n) = 0j{ti)) and
if the new technology exhibits locally decreasing returns to scale, then realized industry
profits are locally increasing in n. Finally,
dW{n,0{n))/dn = (P - C') •{dQ/dn) + {Q/n) •{C{Q/n) - AC{Q/n)). (9)
^^The welfare analysis here is thus confined to the intermediate term effects in the market for the new
product alone. If, for a particular project, there were spill-over effects on other markets, either concurrently
or in the future, the analysis would have to be broadened.
Spill-over effects would not be consutently positive or negative. For instance, introducing the new good—
which means in effect lowering its price from infinity—would have a positive spill-over in an imperfectly
competitive market for an existing complementary good but a negative effect in an imperfectly competitive
market for a substitute. Another example would be the effect of the knowledge generated by current research
in lowering the iZsand raising the rs of future Ri^D projects. Asshown in Section VI, lowering R and raising
r would not always increase the expected welfare of those future RicD projects.
^^The relationship between n and n •x{n,fi{n)) was previously studied by Seade (1980) (using a slightly
different formulation) and, independently, by Quirmbach (1982).
Page 11
Thus, realized welfare will be nondecrtasing in n, except perhaps when the technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2. In the GDGC model:
(i) For any two' industry types G and H, Ng>^ if and only if Nh > 0.
(ii) Now suppose that industry G is more collusive than industry H. Then Nq > Nh-
However, if Nq —Nn^andr >Q, then EW(NG;T\^G{'r^)-,R) <
with strict inequality if Ng.= Nh >,1. Therefore, only if Ng > Nh pan industry G
have higher expected welfare. "
I - ,
Proof. See the Appendix. , .
Further results are available for gehercil demand functions if production costs^are assumed
to exhibit constant returns; this will be designated the General Demand-Constant Returnsor
GDCR model. Still more results can be obtained ifspecific demand functions are imposed in
addition to constant returns in costs. Two different demand function forms will be examined:
linear and. isoelastic. These functional form results *will be identifiedcbelow. as being from
the Linear Demand-Constant-Returns (LDCR) model and .the Isoelastic Demand-Constant
.Returns (IDCR) model. . . .
To facilitate comparison of numerical results, let lis normalize currency units so that
rea/z2erf,welfare under.perfect competition would be.unity,. I choose this as the.benchmark
. because this is themaximum realizable welfare,,gross ofresearch costs. One ran then-measure
•the deviations from this value due to research .costs, imperfect competition, and uncertainty,
the three key factors mentioned in the Introduction.
In the LDCRmodel, let the inverse demand curve be P(Q) = a—6*<5,.and let,C(g) = c-q.
Then, realized welfare under competition would be t^(n, 0) = (a—c)^/2b. If this expression
is set to unity, then some straightforw^d calculations yield the normalized firm profit and
social welfare expressions for, n > 1 in Table 1. ^
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Table 1 here.
Table 1: Linear Demand-Constant Returns (LDCR) Model
Table 2 here.
Table 2: Isoelastic Demand-Constant Returns (IDCR) Model
In the IDCR model, let the inverse demand curve be P(Q) = a * where e is the
price elasticity of demand. Again, let C{q) = cq. For a joint profit maximizing solution to
exist at positive output, we of course need e < ~1. Then, realized welfare under competition
would be H^(n,0) =—+ Again, if this is set to unity, some easy calculations
yield the normalized profit and welfare expressions for n > 1 in Table 2.
III. Collusion and Expected Welfare
When private industry undertakes R&D, there is a Schumpeterian trade-off between
static and dynamic efficiency. By creating new products, firms doing R&D contribute to the
dynamic performance of the economy, but firms will not invest in R&D unless their expected
profits are sufficient to cover their R&D costs. Thus, if the new technology exhibits constant
or increasing returns, the anticipated post-innovation price must exceed marginal cost in at
least some research outcomes before any firms will undertake R&D. Even with decreasing
returns, the profits from marginal cost pricing may not generate much R&D effort. Hence,
some static pricing inefficiency is usually necessary to improve dyneimic research efficiency.
This section examines the extent to which collusion improves expected welfare. This issue
is addressed both in the general case and by comparing joint profit maximizing collusion with
Cournot and Bertrand industries. I also evaluate the "optimal" degree of collusion. All of
these comparisons are made for a range of success probabilities and R&D costs.
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ril-A-;, A Fe-vy ,(General,Results .
The focus of this subsection is primarily,on. the comparison between perfect collusion
and other industry types for the range of success probability values r and research costs R.
Proposition 1 shows that, given R, ziU industry types achieve the same expected welfare for
the lowest probability projects. The same is true for the highest values ofR at any given r.
Moreover, for high values of r and values of i? a bit lower than in Proposition !, a perfectly
collusive industry actually .does worse than any other in the GDCR model (Proposition 2).
Putting these two results together, Proposition 3Ands a valile of R abbv^ which a perfectly
collusive industry can never^outperform any. other industry at any r in the GDCRmodel. It
' I' ' • i. . '
remains for Proposition 4 to find a parameter range for which perfect collusion can do well:
the low to moderate values of t and the intermediate values of 721 '
Proposition 1. In the GDGC model, i/R andr satisfy
• >r•j(l - f) •r(l,;gj(l)) +r• =E,r{2,T,Mn)), (10)
, . • • - • I• • , V " • J . . • 1' I V. i , <•. .
then either No = Nh ^ I or Nq Nh - 0, and
• - • -• EW{Nd,T,0a{n);Ry=EW{NH,rjH(n),R^ '' (11)
.'for all industry types G, H. • - • ' -
Pjvof. See the Appendix.
- .1 .. i ..v:' • ac-/.,..''.. , .. ••'''/.•
The reason all industri^ produce ^ual expectedtwelfare-when (10)^holds is ourassump
tion that an unregulated monopoly"?always behaves" in.standwd fashion (i-.e.', -that.;3x(l) = 1
for ^1 -V). Under (10), at .most one, firm does. R^D in-any^. industry. Then there are at
most twppossible,putcom^, n = 0,and n.=-Ij.and the(success'probabillti<^ and realized
performances are the same for all Industrie jn each. .."More collusion" neither induces the
first fl^ to inyest nor,changes^that firm's perform^ce>because,when.n < 2; all industries
are in effect equally allusive. ^ •- ^
Increased:collusion can increase expected-welfare bnlyiif it: leads, to more than one firm
doing R&p, .But,.even if more collusion do^ produce.a higher.higher expected welfare
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does not necessarily follow. Indeed, as the following proposition shows, for high values of
r and values of a bit lower than in (10), a perfectly collusive industry has the tuorsi
performance of any industry type in the GDCRmodel.
Proposition 2. In the GDCR models let industry G be less than perfectly collusive. If
Ei:%r,^j(n)) > i? > r •(1 - r) •W{\, 1), (12)
'then
EW{NG,r,0G(n),R) > EW(Nj,T,pj{n),RY (13)
A necessary condition for (12) is thai
Proof. See the Appendix,
Note that the~ value r* is such that £;r(2, T*,;9j(n)) = r* •(1 —r') •W^(l,l).
The first inequality in (12) indicates that the investment incentive of a second firm in a
perfectly collusive industry is positive; thesecond inequality implies that theexpected welfare
contribution of that second investment is negative in the GDCR model. That expected
welfare contribution is negative at high values ofr because a second investment ina perfectly
collusive industry is unproductive duplication when r is near one: the most likely outcome
then is that both firms succeed, biit a second success has no effect on realized welfare, since
^(2j^j(2)) = W^(li^j(l)) in the GDCR model. The proof shows that the expected welfare
contributions of all subsequent investments in this industry are then also negative. Thus,
when (12) holds, the higher profitability of a perfectly collusive industry induces more firms
to invest than is socially optimal for that industry.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the interaction of Propositions 1 and 2 for two special cases of
the GDCRmodel: the Linear Demand-Constant Returns (LDCR) model and the Isoelastic
Demand-Constant Returns (IDCR) model with e = —2. In each figure, E-7r(2,T,0j{n)) and
r • (1 —r) •W(l,l) are graphed as functions of r. These curves divide the space of (r, i?)
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. Figure 1 here. -
Figure 1: Values of r.and iZ.for Propositions 1-4: LDCR Model
Figure 2 here.
i * ' ' j '
Figure 2: Values of r and R for Propositions 1-4: IDCR Model with e = —2
'I '' ' '•' I •
values into several regions; the ones in which Propositions 1 and 2 hold are indicated in each
figure. As these figures suggest, in the GDCR model there exists a value i2" such that when
R > R* a joint profit maximizing industry never outperforms any other industry for any
value of
Proposition 3. In the GDCR model, there exists a value R' such that, for any less than
perfectly collusive industry G, R> R' implies
EW{NG,r,^G(ny,R)>EW{Nj,r,0j{n^^ (15)
for all T. Specifically, if n-(l, 1)/W(1,1 j > then ii" = r* •(1 - t') •IV(1,1), where r' is
defined in (14). //:r(l,l)/H^(lvl) < |, then R''^ \ •VP^(1,1).''
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 notwithstanding, there are several ways that expectedwelfare might in fact
be higher when greater collusion yields a higher N. Ahigher N increases the likely number
ofR&D winners, since, for any n*, Pr(n >:Ti* | N,t) is increasing in N, This in turn implies,
first, that there will be a greater chance,the good will be produced at ^1—ri.e., that n will be
positive. Second, when n. is larger, realized welfare may behigher if (a) there are decreasing
returns to scale in the new cost function, so that a higher n yields lower industry costs at a
given <3, or if (b) a higher n tends to increase Qenough to offset the effect ofmore collusion.
(See equation (9).) In the constant returns case, a joint profit maximizing industry enjoys
neither advantage (a) nor (b)—a higher n neither increases output nor lowers costs—and, for
"Inthe IDCRmodel, r- = 3^ >2and R' ={2e.(2e+l)/(3e+l)2}.{c/(c+l)}« < f-«?(-!) «= 0.163502
for e € (—00; —1). The tighter bound on thus applies in the IDCR model. Spediically, when e = —2,
then r- = 0.8 and R' = 0.12. In the LDCR model, r* = J i? = 0.1875.
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the high r values of Proposition 2, the increased chance that n is positive is not sufficient to
justify the added research expenditure. The next proposition, however, demonstrates that
perfect collusion does outperform a less than perfectly collusive industry over a lower range
of r values, provided that R is neither too high nor too low.
Proposition 4. In the GDGCmodel, 3f > 0 such that if indust-ry G is less than perfectly
collusive, then Vr G (0, f) and Vi? such that
En{2,T,Pj{n)) >R> max{ET(2,T,^t7(n)),^T(3,T,/3y(n))} (16)
it is the case that
EWiNj,Tjj{n),R) > EW{Na,Tja{n),R). (17)
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Figures 1 and 2, the (r, i?) values for which Propositon 4 might hold are indicated.
(Whether it does hold depends on the comparison industry.) Perfect collusion might provide
higher expected welfare in addition for some of the (r, R) values in the unmarked section
of each figure. This remains to be determined. As the figures also indicate, the GDCR
model the f identified in the proof of Proposition 4 happens to coincides with the r" of
Proposition 2.
III-B. Functional Form Results
The evidence so far indicates that, while perfect collusion may be beneficial in some
circumstances, it does not improve expected welfare for high cost projects or for projects
of any given cost if the success probability is either very high or very low. In more generzil
terms, what we have established to this point are qualitative comparisons of expected welfare
performance, mostly with a perfectly collusive industry, for certain ranges of the parameters
r and R,
A number of tasks remain. First, we must assess the quantitative magnitudes of the
qualitative differences identified in Propositions 2-4: how much worse is perfect collusion
when it is the worst? How much better in those Ccises where it is best? Since the parameter
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values to which Proposition 4applies depend on,the companson industry, .a related question
is to find out just how widely that proposi^on does apply against specific alternatives such
as Coumot and Bertrand. Finally, the qualitative and quantitative effects of various levels
of collusion must be assessed for those,parameter values not. included in, Propositions 1-4.
For all of these comparisons we n^d to (^oose specific industry types,- The comparisons
in this subsection will be among joint profit maximizing, Bertrand, and.Cournot industries.
To make quantitative assessments,, we. also,need to choose specific functional forms and
parameters. Figures 3, 4, and 5 graph expected welfarejn the LDCRmodel for research cost
values R = .04, .08, and .16, respectively.., Figures 6, 7,.and ,8 graph expected welfare for
the IDCR model with demand elasticity e = -2 and R = .02, .04, and .08. In each figure,
theprobability ofresearch success r is on the horizontcd .axis ^d expected welfare is on the
' Figure 3 here.
Figure 3: Expected Welfare for the LDCR Model with R = 0.04
« ' I * • - -f ' • I * • »
• . . /V-.. » J . ' ^ ^ ••
Figure ,4 here.
Figure 4: Expected Welfare for the LDCR Model with R = 0.08
Figure 5 here.'
Figure 5: Expected Welfare for the'LDCR Model with R —0.16
Figure 6 here.
Figure 6: Expected Welf^e. for the IDCR Model with c = -2 ^d = 0.02
Fijgure 7 here.
Figure 7: Expected W^elfare for the IDCR Model with e = -2 and = 0.04
Figure 8 here.
Figure 8: Expected Welfare for the IDCR Model with e= -2 and iE = 0.08
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vertical. Expected welfare is computed from (7) for increments ofr of .01 from 0.00 to 1.00.
Discontinuities in individual curves have been joined for visual clarity.
In each figure, the topmost curve is the "first-best" expected welfare. Achieving this
expected welfare would require the new good to bepriced at marginal cost in all outcomes—
even for a monopoly—and would require the number of firms doing research to be chosen
optimally given this pricing policy. Since there are constant returns in the new production
technology in these examples, such a pricing policy would always result in zero realized
profits and net expected profits of —per firm. This outcome is clearly not sustainable in a
laissez-faire market, but it will be useful as a benchmcirk for evaluating industry types that
are feasible in the market.
The second highest curve in each figure represents the expected welfare under the optimal
feasible /3(n), where "feasible" means satisfying (4). This curve will beexplained in thenext
subsection. The other three curves in, each figure are the graphs of expected welfare for a
Bertrand industry, a Cournot industry, and a joint profit maximizing industry, £is indicated.
As one can see from Figures 1 and 2, the higher R vdues in Figures 5 and 8 were
chosen specifically to explore the parameter regions covered by Proposition 2and, especially,
by Proposition 4 for the respective models. The lower two R values for each model put
rather greater emphasis on the parameter ranges not covered in any of the propositions.
In all cases, the curves in the figures exhibit features typical for R values in the respective
neighborhoods.^®
Several strong impressions emerge from the LDCR graphs. First, except for low values
of r, a joint profit maximizing industry generally does far worse than either a Bertrand or
a Coumot industry. This is especially true for the lower R values. Thus, in these examples
the qualitative disadvantage of perfect collusion for high r identified in Proposition 2 is
also quajititatively significant. Moreover, this disadvantage extends well beyond the range
^^Additional computations and the programs which generated them are available on request.
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identified in that proposition. For instance,- when R =. ;04 in this model, the 'precondition
(12) of Proposition 2 is satisfied only, for r. > 0.9.435, yet perfect collusion is clearly worse
than Bertrand or Cournot for r -valuesi^l the way downl.below 0.20. '" >'
Second, in these examples the quantitative significance of.the advantage of perfect col
lusion identified in Proposition, 4 is slight when the comparison industry is Cournot. This
, is true both in terms of the range of r values over which perfect collusion yields higher ex
pected welfare ^d in terms of.the magnitude of that performance advantage. In Figure 5,
where the value R = .16.'was chosen to-give, Proposition 4 the gr^test chance of success,
the range of revalues over which, the.precondition (16) isisatisfied in comparison to Cournot
turns put tQ be yery narrow:, .4000 <,r .< .4163, approximately." Even>within this range the
expecte^ welfare advantage bf.^perfect collusion is rather small, about .02 -or roughly 15%
above Cournot expected welfare. -For the R = .0.4'and —.08cases,' the ranges of r values
. satisfying (16)yare eyen narrower-:rindeed,ito.Ojnarrow to.be picked up-in the figures,- where
r values are graphed iniincrements,of'.OL /.j . s' :
As,c^ be seen from Figures .4.and'5^ the ranges of r values over-which perfect-collusion
outperforms Bertrand under Proposition 4 are somewhat wider. However, the differences in
expected welfare are ageiin not large.i. ... • \
In cpmparing Biertrand with Cournot', we see that they'•frequently alternate in the top
spot in the middle ^and high rangesrof-r, withvBertremd having something of-an advantage
for R = ,.04 and. themqderately/morexollusive Cournot doin^ a bit"^better for th6 higher R
values. Except for low t, each ofthese two industry types captures a relatively large portion
of the first-best expected welfare, especially in Figures 3 ^d 4. . - -.
. Many of the same patterns hold in the ID.CR model with.e.= -2. The,expect^ welfare
'°It should also.be mentioned, that perfect collusion.outperforms both Bertrand and Cournot in a couple
of instances not covered by this proposition. When 'H = .04 and r =\10, it "turns out that Nj = h and
EW(Nj,T,Ry= Q,l07i^ vf\ijXe_Nc —4,and EW{Nc,t^c{^)jR) = 0.1054, and while Nb = 3 and
EW{NB,T,pB{n), R) = 0,0903. Asmiilar situation dccure when R = .08,and.r = .20. Thwe are isolated
points in our grid ofr values, and the performance advantages ofperfect coliusion;are small in both instances.
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disadvantages of perfect collusion compared to Bertrand and to Cournot are again large
for the higher r values that are the subject of Proposition 2. And, except in comparison
to Bertrand in the R = .08 case, these disadvantages again extend to r values well below
tnose of the proposition, the range of r values over which perfect collusion does better
than Cournot and Bertrand is somewhat larger in this model and, especially for R = .08,
the amount of the advantage is here more significant. Still, over the whole range of values,
perfect collusion again appears inferior to Cournot, Here Cournot also seems mildly superior
to Bertrand, and Bertrand is still preferable to perfect collusion for the lower values of R.
Understanding the reasons for the differences between the LDCR and the IDCR graphs
is something we will be better able to do after the development of some additional material
in the next two sections. Before leaving these examples, we should cdso take note of an
important anomaly that will also be explored in later sections, namely that the expected
welfare of a particular industry can actuallyfall when t rises. This occurs for the Bertrand
curve at various points in all the figures except Figures 5 and 8. It also occurs for Cournot
(e.g., between r = .64 and .65 in Figure 7) and for the joint profit maximizing curve (e.g.,
between r = .41 and .42 in Figure 4).
The overall impression from these examples (and from a variety ofother R and e values
I have examined^^) is that, except for very low probability projects, a perfectly collusive
industry simply does not perform very well, despite (because of?) its higher R&D effort.
The far less collusive Cournot and Bertrand industry types quite often yield substantially
higher expected welfare.
III.C. The Optimal Degree of Collusion
The comparisons of expected welfare in the Bertrand, Cournot, and joint profit max
imizing csLses—and especially the finding that no one of these three is always best—leads
naturally to the questions of what the optimal market solution is for the production stage
'^ Available on request.
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and what expected welfare it produces. Of course, as explained above in the, description of
the benchmark expected welfare curves, the first-best outcome requires margin^ cost pricing
for any n, a solution which is generally not viable in,a market where firms have to cover their
own R&D costs. The question addressed here iS'a second-best one: what anticipated outputs
and prices for the new product will generate the maximum expected welfare, provided that
each firm's expect^ profits must.still be sufficient to cover R7 ,This would be the question
faced, for instance, by a hypothetical regulator or cinti^ust policymaker who could influence
the pricing of the new product but who could not directly subsidize research.
The instruments for this constrained optimization problem could be specified as Ny the
number of firms to invest, Md {/i(n) : .n = 1,...,7V}, a sequence of prices, one for each
research outcome n. Or, the instruments could be N and a sequence of quantities {Q(n) :
n = However, since, for any given n, P.is strictly increasing in 0 and Q is
strictly decreasing, it is mathematically equivalent to specify the choice variables as N and a
sequence of ^s, {^(n) ; n = 1,... ,7V}. The solution /?s can then be interpreted as "optimal
degrees of collusion."
- Actually, for any given project, it turns.out that there is one optimal degree of collusion:
while the opti.m^-;3(n).schedule will depend, on .r and R '^ it turns" out-not to depend on n.
Proposition 5. In the GDGC model, let the solution to
max subject to £;r(iV,T,^(n)) > i2 (18)
he 7V",y5'(l),.. .,^"(iV"), where I denotes the set ofnon-negqUve integers. If N' > 0, then
^"(1) = ... == P* for some constant p*.
Proof, See the.Appendix. ^ - ,-j
The problem of the pptiind degree ofcollusion is similar to the Ramsey pricing prpblem,
with expected welfare and profits replacing realized welfare and profits and N potential
'^ More precisely, the price or quantity instruments'could be chosen beforehand in anticipation that N will
then determined by entry according to (4). " '
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research outcomes replacing N product lines. With independent demands, the Ramsey
solution dictates that the social cost of raising an extra dollar toward meeting the profit
constraint i.e., {P—C')/{MR—C')—must be the same for all product lines. Here the same
ratio must be identical for all research outcomes. Then (1) implies the desired result.
Ifmarginal costs are constant, then 0' being independent of n implies, by Lemma l(ii),
that Q and P will also be independent of n: a fixed total output quota and a fixed price
for any research outcome. If marginal costs are not flat, then Q increases with n despite
a constant 0'. Regardless of the shape of marginal costs, however, if demand is isoelastic,
then the Lerner index is independent ofn even if Q is not. To see this, rearrajige (1) to give
P{Q) - C'{Q/n) 0
P{Q)
where e is the demand elasticity.
Figure 9 here.
Figure 9: The Optimal 0 for the LDCR Model
Figure 10 here.
Figure 10: The Optimal ^ for the IDCR Model with c = -2
(19)
For the LDCR and IDCR (e = —2) models, Figures 9 and 10, respectively, show as a
function of r for the same R values as in the earlier figures. As before, discontinuities are
filled in for visual clarity. A benchmark line is drawn at ^ = 5, representing the level of0
associated with Coumot duopoly.
For the very lowest values of r, not even ;9 = 1 generates enough profit to cover even
for N = I. In the range of r for which (18) has solutions with N' > 0, the general trend
^^Equation (19) has one curious implication. Suppose that marginal costs are not flat, so that Q increases
with n. If the absolute value of demand elasticity decreases as Q increases, as for instance with Linear
demand, then (19) and the constancy of 0* imply that the Lerner index actually increases with n, despite
the increase in Q.
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is for P* to decrease ,in r and .increase, in although neither tendency is uniform.^^ At
the lowest feasible r values along ea<^ curve, the priya^ investment prospects are worst,
and high values of are needed to generate, enough expected profit to induce investment.
However, for a given iJ, the range of r for which > 5 is usually much less than half of
the feasible x interved. The, only, major exception is the JDCR case in which R = .08, the
same case for .which perfect collusion ;turned in its best relative performance in the earlier
. analysis. Otherwise, the optimal degree of.collusion is^generaUy less than that exhibited by
a Coumot duopoly. .. ; ^
The second-best expected welfare achieved by and namely EW(N*^t^P'^R)^ is
graphed in Figures .3-8.?®. Comparing this second-b^t expected welfare to'the first-best
benchmark shows that optimizing the degree of collusion—even subject to the constraint of
expected R&D cost coverage—comes quite close to achieving first-best performance. The
' ., s>'' ''
exceptions to this statement appear at the low values of t—generally where either 0' \s high
or AT > 0 is simply infeasible.
The overall message of this whole section thus seems to be that high levels of collusion
are not often advantageous, and what advantage they do provide is not often substantial.
For most cases, especially in the range of moderate to high probability projects, much lower
levels of collusion such as Cournot and Bertrand do much better.
IV. Success Probability and the Number of Firms
Doing R&D
This section examines how r, the probability of research success, influences the equilib
rium number of firms investing in RicD. This issue is important for several reasons beyond
its intrinsic interest. First, the levelof innovativeactivity—here measured by the equilibrium
N—is often considaed a measure ofeconomic performance that is independently important,
^^For more closely spaced R values, the graphs often cross.
and 0* are both functions of H and r, of course.
' • - . • ' I -; . .. s o • ' • J
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not just important through its effect on expected welfare. And, as explained below, many
government policies can affect N through r.' Second, understanding the effect of r on is
a key step in explaining the anomalous effects of r on expected welfare that were mentioned
in Section III.
An increase in r exerts two forces on a firm's expected profits. A higher r means that
a firm is more likely to reap a reward from its own R&:D investment. However, it also
means that its rivals are also more likely to succeed, so that the size of the reward for each
individual firm is likely to be smaller. The net effect on expected profits at a given N—
and thus the effect on the equilibrium N—can go either way. The following proposition
establishes conditions under which an increase in r decreases expected profits at a given N
and thus tends to decrease equilibrium investment.
Proposition 6. For any N >2, if N •-KiN.PxiN)) <{N -\)- Tr({N - l),Px(N - 1)),
then there exists f < 1 such that E7r{N,Tyl3x{n)) is decreasing in r on (f, I], This is in
particular true either if the new technology exhibits increasing returns in the neighborhood of
or if returns to scale are constant and Px(^) < ~ 1) ^ 1*
Proof. See the Appendix.
Neither increasing nor constant returns to scale are necessary for Proposition 6. As (8)
indicates, even if returns to scale are moderately decreasing, n«T(n, (n)) may be decreasing
in n if industry X is adequately competitive. Moreover, the value of r need not be close
to unity. For example, in a Bertrand industry in the GDCR model, =
T• (1 — • jr(l, 1). Expected profits are thus maximized at f = l/N.
As noted above, when r increases, a firm has a better chance of getting a reward from
R&D, but the reward is likely to be smaller. The latter effect dominates under the conditions
of Proposition 6. The reason is that 7r(n,^jf(n)) falls more quickly with n when pricing
discipline is less than perfect and/or when smaller market shares raise unit costs under
increasing returns. Under Proposition 7, the trade-off goes the oppositeway, and an increase
Page 25
in T tends to incr^e equilibrium investment. -
Proposition 7. For,any given N > 0, expected profits are ihc^asing in t t/n *7r(n,/3x("))
is nondecreasing in n for n > 0. This is iri particular^true if industry X is perfectly collusive
and the new technology exhibits either constant or decreasing returns.
Proof See the Appendix.
Again, the particular conditions for" the proposition are sufficient but not necessary. As
(8) indicates, even if the potential producers are riot perfectly collusive, n • (n)) can
still be incre^ing in n'if the returns to scale are^sufficiently decreasing.
Proposition 7 applies to all values of r while Proposition 6 applies only to values of r
above some f. The reason Proposition 6 is not the mirror image of Proposition 7 is that
n •T(n, cannot be decreasing in n for all n > 0, since 0•7r(0,^xj = 0. When r is
very low, the weight of the'distribution r«ts mostly on the n = 0 and n = 1 outcomes, even
when TV > 1, In this case, an increase in r always'increases expected profits, as established
in'the following proposition!
• • . -I •
Proposition 8. For any N > 0 and for any industry X, there exists a r > 0 such that
^KWiTiPxi^)) w increasing j'n r on [Oir).- I ^
Proof. See the Appendix.
There are a numberof government policies which could affect r. Environmental, health,
and safety standards all tend to lower r by raising additional obstacles to developing a
marketable product. Proposition 6 identifies certain circumstances under which this effect on
Tneed not lead to lower R&D effort. On theother side, government funding ofbasic research
may produce additional scientific knowledge which could raise r for related commercial
"projects. Proposition'6 implies that siich government fun(^ihg may in some cases "crowd
out" rather than stimulate private R&D effort. .-Proposition 8, however, shows that this
• • • '\ 1 ' *
perverse effect is unlikely if government research funding is directed to those areas where
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commercial projects are farthest off—to, in a sense, the most basic of basic research. Of
course, ,all these policies may also affect R, This part of the effect on equilibrium N is more
predictable: higher (lower) R tends to lower (raise) equilibrium N,
V. How Many Firms Should Do R&D?
Is the number of firms undertaking R&D in equilibrium right for a particular industry?
Should there be more? Fewer? This section compares the equilibrium number of firms with
the number which maximizes expected welfare, taking the industry's existing p[n) schedule
as given.^®
This comparison is important both for its intrinsic interest and for other theoretical and
pragmatic reasons. For instance, the results help greatly in explaining the positions of the
expected welfare curves from Section III. Also, the comparison here is the appropriate one for
evaluating policies which affect firms* perceived costs ofresearch but not the real social costs.
Examples of such policies include tax credits for R&D and tax depreciation rules for R&D
investments. The analysis also sheds light on the expected welfare effects of policies which
do affect real research costs and in addition helps to explain the anomalies in the equilibrium
expected welfare curves of Section III.B. These last two questions will be pursued in later
sections.
As inSection III, we will begin with some general qualitative results and then follow with
specific quantitative examples.
V.A. Some Qualitative Results
Rficall that Nx is the equilibrium N for an industry with ^ schedule Let the
optimal Nfor the industry be Nx = ar^max ^VK(7V",r,^jf(n),i2), where / is the set of
^®This second-best comparison is the reverse of the second-best case analyzed in Section III.C., where
expected welfare was optimized over the choice of^ while taking as a constraint that N was determined by
(4).
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non-negative integers.^"^ The .market then pverinvests (underinvesta) if^TVjf > (<)Nx.
Some projects have such a very low probability of-siiccesslor such'a high-cost that invest-
nient by even one firm is socially unjustified- For projects whercit is not quite so terribly low
norR so terribly high, the investment ofat least one firm is socially beneficial .but will not be
undertaken by any industry type. These notions are captured in the following proposition,
the proof of which is immediate. ^ . v.;
- V. . ..-S . f ^ ~
Proposition 9. For any industry G, ifr < R/W{l,l),Hhen 'N^ '== Na = 0, provided
EW(N,T,^a{n), R) is quasi-concavejn iV. IfR/W(l,l) < r < R/7r{l,l), then'Nq = 0 <
1<>G. ^
Proposition 9*s underinvestment result applies equally to all industry types. The next
proposition shows that the optimal level of investment for a perfectly collusive industry is
the lowest of any industry type inthe GDGR model,''ceteris p^ibus.' Thus, for any project,
ifa perfectly collusive industry und'eri'nvests,^ then^^so 'will ali other Tndustry types.^® '
Proposition 10.' In the GDCR model, Nq > Nj for any less than perfectly collusive
industry G. Thus, N}>{>)Nj.fmplies NG >X>)N^ . .. ~ .
Let N** ^he the investment level in the first-best outcome; that is, let 0"(n} = 0for all
n> 1 and Um'" H). '^ TAeh, in ihe^GDCAmodel, N" > N},
• (^)^j ivfiplies N*- > (>)Ng for any industry G. - ' ^
^ 2 i'' • - / • • ' ' ' '
Proo/. See the Appendix. t r ) ,. • •-
^ r • u'!- < ' y' ,
. Id 1 ;' • . ' -
, '^ he usefulness iof Propositpn 10 will be established if we can extend the range of un-
aCTrnvestment of a,perfectly collusive industrysbeyond the very low r-values and very high
R values of Proposition'.9. The next proposition mak^ progress ,in this direction. It also
^^Since N€/, it is possible, even when is strictly concave inJ/,, tbat^there^ may be
two adjacent yalura of^ which maximize expected welfare. .IfI adopt the convention that Nx refers to
the greater of the two.'This parallels the convention adopted fo'r N'x. The choices are not significant, since
both cas^ arise only for sets of parameters of measure .zero,
^^Proposition 10 also provides some cqmpwisons between equil^^ibrium and,first-best investment levels. As
I ar^ed earlier, the firat-best caise may not be of much practicivinter«t, since achieving it would:require
both ^ ante subsidization of research costs and ex poet regulatipn of prices; but'these comparisons may
nevertheless be ofsome aesthetic value. Besides, they were easy to prove.
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shows that, at high enough values of r and low enough values of /?, ajoint profit maximizing
industry overinvests. Moreover, the transition from underinvestment to overinvestment is
(weakly) monotonic in each parameter r and i?.®
Proposition 11. In the GDCR model:
(i) For any R € (0,7r(l,l)], Etq 6 (ii/TrCM), 1] such that, Vr € [0,1], r > tq implies
Mle r < To implies Na < Nq for all industries G. IfR < v(\,\)/2, then,
at T = \, Nj > Nj.
(ii) For any r > 0, 3/^0 € (0,r •7r(l,i)] such that 0 < R< Rq implies Nj > N}, while
R > Rq implies Na < for all industries G.
Proof See the Appendix.
Since the inequalities in Proposition 11 are weak, one cannot say just how far the range
of undermvestment has been extended beyond Proposition 9. However, the evaluation of
numerical examples shows that it is significantly extended inmany cases.
The value of tq as chosen in the proof is increasing in R^ and Rq as chosen is increasing
in T. (See the comment at the end of the proof.) Thus, a higher R tends to shorten the
Tandon (1983, p.156, Proposition 1) offers a closely related result regarding over- and underinvestment
in R&D. Although his model provides for patent protection and specifies the research process in asomewhat
different way, it is possible by reinterpreting his model to show that itimplies the core result ofmy Proposition
11, namely the comparisons of Nj and N}.
However, both Tandon's proposition and an earlier version of my Proposition II (Quirmbach, 1987) deal
only with acontinuous approximation: "the integer problem [is] suppressed" (Tandon, p.l54) and Nj and N}
are treated as continuous variables. The results are then misleadingly sharp. The continuous approximation
results indicate that the transition from under- to overinvestment is strictly monotonic: that, for instance,
underinvestment occurs on a contiguous range of low r values while overinvestment occurs on a contiguous
range ofhigh r values. Such strict monotonicity, however, is not truly the case. For example, when R = .175
in the LDCR model, Nj < N} for .24 < r < .34, and Nj = for .35 < r < .37. However, Nj < N} again
for .38 < r < .45. Then Nj = Nj again for -46 < r < .62, before Sj > N} finally occurs for r > .63. From
the other direction, for R= .1111, Nj > N} for r > .34 and Nj = Nj for r = .33. but then Nj^ Nj again
for .31 < r < .32 and Sj ss Nj for .26 < r < .30. Thus, the inequalities in the conclusions of Proposition
11 must be weak.
Note that, while treating N as continuous gives only approximate results, the same is not true of treating
n as continuous in Section 11. Treating N as continuous mesuis treating the fint stage equilibrium condition
(4) as an equality when for an integer N it may hold as a strict inequality. In contrast, the corresponding
equation for equilibrium in the second stage, equation (1), holds as an exact equality, even when n is limited
to the integers.
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range of high r values for which a perfectly collusive industry overinvests and to lengthen
the range of low r values.for which it underinvests. A higher r correspondingly lengthens
the range of low R values for which there is overinvestment and shortens the range of high
Rq values for which there is underinvestment.
At the other end of the competition scale is a Bertrand industry. In the GDCR model,
such an industry never overinvests and in many cases strictly underinvests.^
Proposition 12. In the GDCR model, Nb'< Vt g [0,1] andVR > O.-^Nb < Ng if
i2/lV(l,l) < r < i2/;r(l,l). Nq is also strictly less than Ng if t > i2/7r(l,l) and any one
of the following holds:
(i) NB-{l-W(hl))>7r(l,l);or
(ii) r = 1 flnti (1 - IV(1,1)) >; or .iw- .
' • ' . ii' • r i ^ '
(iii) in the LDCR or IDCR model, Nb > 2; or
(iv) :n the LDCR model, either t < ~ orR < ^; or
(v) :n the IDCR model, e G[-2,-1).
i. ^
Proof See the Appendix.
The expression (1 —1^(1,1)) is the deadweight loss due to monopoly, which is eliininated
if a second Bertrand firm succeeds. This helps e^^lain item (ii)-of the proposition.
Between Bertrand and-perfect collusion lies the-Coumot.case. Here, the^results are
muddier. Proposition 9 stiU indicates underinvestment in.projects where r is so low or R so
high that Nc = 0, and Propositions lO and 11 allow us to.bootstrap further underinv^tment
results from the perfect collusion case. Aside^from these findings, however, I have been able
,to establish Coumot r^ults only by using specific functional'forms. Even then, about the
only clear result is just for the case of t == 1. For that''case. Proposition 13 suggests that
there is usually overinvestment in low cost projects and; correct investnient in medium cost
^°Sah Md Stiglitz (1987, p.105) also obtain an underinvestment rrault in an R&D model with Bertrand
competition. However, .their result compares the equilibrium level of investment with the investment level
ofthe firsi'htsi outcome—i.e., where there is marginal cost'pricing even for n = 1.-
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projects. However, underinvestment can occur at r = 1 in the IDCR model even when
Ac > 0. Of course, Proposition 9governs when R is so high that Nc = 0.
Proposition 13. Let t = 1. In the IDCR model, when e ——2, —0 if R > 5-
Otherwise, in that model,
(I-i) Nc = N'c = l if\>R>
(I-ii) Nc'=Nc = 2if§^>R>^,and
(1-iii) Nc >Nc if-^> R;
(I-iv) BUT JVc = 1< = 2 >/ s > i-
In the LDCR model, Nc = 0 ifR>\. Otherwise,
(L-i) Nc = N^ = '^ ifk^R>l
(L-ii) Nc = Nc = 2ifj^>R>l and
(L-iii) Nc > Ac otherwise.
Pwof. See the Appendix.
The above propositions establish that all industry types underinvest in low probability,
high cost projects. For high probability, low cost projects, however, ajoint profit maximizing
industry overinvests. ACournot industry may also have some tendency to overinvest in such
projects, but aBertrand industry underinvests in nearly everything.
'^Tandon (1984) addreasea the LDCR case in his Proposition 1(p.399). His result is that Nc >
whenever Nc >2. This is inconsistent with (L-ii) of my Proposition 13. The explanation of the
Ua in the fact that Tandon Ignores the integer problem" (p.396) by treating the equihbrium entry condit onLaL equX (^.mTare his^uation (10) (p.396) with my inequality (4).) When one restrict, to the
the fL-iil caae appears. Tandon also claims (I-iii). .
Nc = 0 < N^-
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V-B. Some .Quantitative Results
It remains to be seen whether the qualitative results 'of the preceding subsection are
quantitatively significant. For a perfectly collusive industry, how large are. the ranges of
parameters which produce over- and underinvestment, and how large are the welfare losses?
How serious are the welfare losses of Bertrand underinvestment? What is the overall welfare
performance of a Cournot industry, and. is there over- or underinvestment for middle values
of r and R? What do these investment results tell us about the equilibrium expected welfare
comparisons of Section III?
In this subsection, I present graphical comparisons of equilibrium expected welfare and
the expected welfare achieved when investment is optimized; i.e., of EW(NxR)
and EW{NxjT^^x(^)iR)* This is done for perfectly collusive, Bertrand, and Cournot in
dustries for some of the same parameter values depicted in Section III.B. In each of the
graphs that follow, the top curve is again the first-best benchmark. The second highest
curve is the optimized investment expected,welfare for the^particular industry. The lower
curve(s) is (are) the equilibrium expected welfare. ' .
... The results graphed are again from the LDCRand IDCR models, the.latter with e = —2.
Fora joint profit maximizing indust^ and for a given value of i?, both models yield.the same
first-best and second-best expected.welfare curves. Thesame is true for a Bertrand industry.
The reason is that, for both industry types, all the relevant values-of realized welfare.are the
same between the two models. Of.couree, the first-;best realized welfare is always normalized
to unity. For both industries, the only other rdev^t realized welfare outcome is W(l, 1),
which is achieved when n = 1 for Bertrand and when n > 1 for; perfect, collusion. In both
models, W(l, 1) = This coincidence ofwelfare values allows the perfect collusion results
of both models to be graphed on^the same axes, and similarly for the Bertrand results.
What is different for Bertr^d ^d perfect collusion betw^nthe.two models is the realized
profit. For both industry types, the only positive realized industry profit is 7r(l,l); but
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''•(I'l) = 2 LDCR model, while 7r{l,l) = ^ in the IDCR model with e = -2. Thus,
the investment incentive is twice as large for LDCR, leading usually to more firms investing
in equilibrium and to a different expected welfare.
Figure 11 here.
Figure 11: Equilibrium and Optimized Investnfient Expected Welfare:
Perfect Collusion with R = 0.08
Figure 1- here.
Figure 12: Bertrand Equilibrium and Optimized Investment Expected Welfare
with R = 0.04
The joint profit maximizing industry case is graphed in Figure 11 for i? = .08. The
LDCR equilibrium curve exhibits several features common for this industry for many R
values in both the LDCR and IDCR models. In particular, the overinvestment predicted by
Proposition 11 at high values of r turns out to be rather serious. The range ofoverinvestment
actually extends well down the rangeof r values. The equilibrium expectedwelfare could be
roughly doubled for r > .50 by reducing the number'of firms doing research to the optimal
number. Put another way, the welfare loss due to overinvestment accounts for roughly half
the gap between the perfectly collusive equilibrium and the first-best expected welfare and
well overhalf the gap between the perfectly collusive and the Bertrand and Cournot industry
tj'pes. There is underinvestment for low values of r, again as predicted by Proposition 11,
but both the range and the expected welfare significance are much smaller than for the
overinvestment problem.
In Section III, the R = .08 case of the IDCR model was the only one shown for which
perfect collusion compared reasonably favorably with Bertrand and Cournot. Figure 11
indicates why: as compared to the LDCR case, the IDCR case has a much smaller overin
vestment problem at high r, although the underinvestment problem at low r is somewhat
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larger. Neither change should beespecially surprising in light ofthe differences in inv^tment
incentives between the LDCR and IDCR,models.. The IDCR model provides less,incentive
and therefore has less overinvestment,and more underinvestment.
Next consider a Bertrand,industry..Figure 12,shows the Bertrand,equihbrium and opti
mized investment re?ults^,when R =,.04; P.ropositign 12.,^lls us^ that-^^the problem here will
, be strict underinvestment for allr > R/W{1,1) ^ .0533., In the LDCR case, the equilibrium
expiect^ welfare comes fairly close to the optimized investment ^expected welfare: the magni
tude of the LDCR underinvestment problem is not all that,large; Correcting the investment
level would again, cut the gap between,the equilibrium and the first-best .by half; however,
here the gap is much smaller th^ in the perfect .collusion, case. Qwingjo thejpwer .invest
ment incentive, the expected welfare magnitude of the Bertrand underinvestment problem
in the IDCR c^e is larger. This is part of the reason why Bertrand .seems to fall behind
Cournot more often in the IDCR examples than in the LDCR ones.
^ I " 'ft-- -T"-.' •••' I- " - '* •"
Figure 13. here.
Figure 13: Cournot Equilibrium and<pptimized Investment Exp.ected Welfare
•with 'iJ = 0;04 in theXDCR Moder
'-of V-.,. .r • Ci
f Figure-14.here.' . , -,.,1:;
Figure .14: Cournot-Equilibrium and Optimized Investment ,Expected ^Welfare
with R = 0.04 and e = -2 in the'lDCR Model
;•>! . •• 1' f.'..
The Cournot c^ewith R= ,04 is depict^ in Figures,13 and 14ior the LDCR andJDCR
models, respectively. For the LDCR example, Prcyosition 13 indicate pyerinvestment at
f*. However, ^ Fi^re 13 shows,^thcjr^ulting expected.welfare .deviation is
not all tha.t large—^roughly on the order of the. Bertrand underinvestment deviation for the
same case and certainly much lower than the perfect'collusion overinvestment deviation
'' . ,01 !' ' ' 11 , ,1 . .
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turns out to be for that case.^^ There is a modest stretch of lower r values along which the
equilibrium investment level is just right. At very low r there is of course underinvestment, •
but the associated welfare losses are quite small.
In the IDCR example in Figure 14, there is overinvestment at the very highest values
of r (i.e., .99 < r < 1), again as predicted by Proposition 13, but the expected welfare
significance is almost invisible. Thedeviation in the range of .65 < r < .76 is actually due to
underinvestment and is again small. Otherwise, for t > .60, the equilibrium and optimized
investment curves coincide. The only significant deviation in this example lies below r = .60
and is the result of underinvestment. This welfare deviation is ofrelatively moderate size; it
is for instance less than the Bertrand underinvestment deviation for the same parameters in
the same model.
The differences between these two Cournot examples are explained by thegenerally lower
levels of realized profits in the IDCR model for all outcomes n. Thus, overinvestment is less
of a problem and underinvestment more of a problem in the IDCR example.
The most significant impressions from the Cournot examples are how often the equilib
rium level of investment is just right and how small the expected welfare losses are when it
is not. (Other examples with other parameters show even closer correspondences between
Cournot equilibrium and optimized investment curves.) Cournot equilibrium investment is
not predictably bad by a largemargin in either direction, the qualitative results of Proposi
tion 13 notwithstanding.
These over- and underinvestment results for the three industry types provide valuable
insight into the relative positions of the equilibrium expected welfare curves of Section III.B.
Part of this insight is gained by realizing that when investment is optimized in each industry,
the resulting expected welfare is higher in a less collusive industry than in a more collusive
industry. Formally, for any two industries G and if, if G is less colllusive than if, then
Additional computations available on request.
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the definition of Nq and the usual effect of collusion on realized welfare together imply that
EW{N^,Tja{nhR) > ^ ,
Perfect collusipn performs poorly in comparison to both Bertrand and Cournot for mid
dle to high values of r in most of the examples of Section In these examples, it
can be shown that a perfectly collusive industry seriously,overinvests over the same range
of T—i.e., that the position of the^LDCR equilibrium, curve in relation to the^.optimized
investment curve in Figure 11 is typical. ^The expected welfare deviations associated with
misinvestment in both Bertrand and Cournot-are generally much smaller,..as .shown in the
above examples. Thus, the p^oorer .performance of perfect .collusion in the,c^es,cited is the
result of a larger expected welfare deviation from a lower optimized investment curve. The
reason that perfect collusion does .comparativdy ^.well in the one IDCR c^e where R —.08
is that the overinvestment problem is much less severe, as shown in Figure 11.
As between Bertrand and.Cournot,,in the LDGR .model'there is not much systematic
difference in the equilibrmm expected welfare curves; [Tbe optimized investment curves are
not all that far apart,-and the misiny^tment deviations ue more or less similar. In the IDCR
examples of Section III, however, =Cournot does a bit better than Bertrand most of the time.
This occurs despite the fact that EW{NbjT^R) ^ EW.(N^^t,0c{''^)^R) because, in
the IDCR, model, a Coumot industry deyiates so little from its optimiz^ investnient pattern
while the Bertrand underinvestment problem is exacerbated by the, lower profit potential.
This a^^ysis provides .the appropriate, comparisons- for cissessing the expected welfare
effects of taxing or subsidizing R&D. Byraising or lowering firms' private research costs,
such polid^ can lower or raise the equilibrium-while not affecting the'real social value of
R, Such policies can thus move.the equilibrium expected ^velfare .either closer .to or farther
from the optimized investment performance.
^^THis observation holds in the GDGC model,- not just in the GDCR inodel.
®^Recall that Proposition' 1explains the identical performance ofall'three industries for low r values.
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There are several policy implications. First, no one policy can be optimal for all cases:
even the qualitative direction—i.e., whether to raise or to lower private R—depends on the
probability and cost of the particular project and the degree of collusion in the particular
industry. Some rough guidelines can be identified, however. For instance, it is probably not
too bad to provide some form of subsidy for low probability projects in all industries and for
all projects in highly competitive industries, when these situations can be identified. Highly
collusive industries, on the other hand, should not be encouraged to invest in moderate to
high probability projects of modest cost—and probably should be somewhat discouraged.
For moderately competitive industries, the best advice may simply be to leave them alone.^®
VI. Probability, Cost, and Expected Welfare
One of the goals set in the Introduction was to understand how probability and research
cost affect expected welfare. With the results of the last two sections in hand, we are now
prepared to do so. The results help in assessing the welfare effects of various government
policies which can affect r and/or i?, zis described in Section IV. The results also explain the
anomalous cases in Section III.B.'s graphs in which expected welfare drops as r increases.
The r and R effects each have two parts: a direct effect holding N constant and an
indirect effect through a change in equilibrium N. The direct effect of higher R on expected
welfare is of course negative. The direct effect of higher t is positive, except perhaps when
returns to scale are, increasing. To see this, note that (9) indicates W'(n,0{n)) is increasing
in n, except perhaps when AC(Qln) > C'(Q/n). When realized welfare increases in n, a first
order stochastic dominance argument shows that EW{N^T^0(n),R) is increasing in r for
fixed N.^ In the GDCRmodel, then, the direct effects always go in the intuitive directions.
The indirect effects are somewhat more complicated. Since the equilibrium N is an inte-
®®These comments apply when the available policy instruments affect only the private perceived R and
not the real social R. They may need to be modified when other policies are also available.
similar argument is used in the proof of Proposition 7.
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ger, chzinges in r or it will, affect N only at discrete points. At those points, the equilibrium
expected welfare curve will be discontinuous. Betw^n.those points, only the direct effects
are observed. Thus,, the equilibrium expected welfare curves in,the figur^ of Section III.B.
are all upward sipping between .discontinuity points. <
When N is affected, a higher R will of course lower AT, but, m Section IV showed, a
higher r may either raise or lower. TV., How, a change in N then aff^ts expected welfare
depends on whether the change tends to correct or to exacerbate under- or overinvestment.
The, anomalous cases of expected welfare .falling as r .incre^es, arise when N- changes so
as to aggravate misinvestment., As ^will be seen,below, a change in R c^n ca.use a similar
phenomenon. ^, , . ' • . —y i
Take first the r effect. For low values of r, Proposition 8 indicates that E7r(JV,r,^x("))
increases in^ t for any,industry implying ih&i Nx tends to incre^e with t. .A higher
Hx will tend to alleviate the underinv^tment that Propositon 9 predicts for low r-for any
industry.-V. Thus, the indirect effect of higher r on equilibrium expected welfare is likely to
be positive at low r. In the GDCR model, this complements the direct effect. And, indeed,
all ofthe industries in all of the examples ,of %ction III.B. show ^strongly increasing expected
welfare in the, lowest range of r values. ^ . •• . / . .. .
In the GDpR model, the expected profits of a perfectly collusive industry at any fixed
N are always strictly increasing in r (Proposition 7). The resulting tendency, for Nj to
increase will again be helpful at low,values of.r* where Propositions 11 and 9 both predict
underinvestment. ... 3 - -
Athigherr, however, Propositon 11 pr^icts oyeriny^tment.--Then, by inducing a higher
iVj, an increase, in r could actually reduce expected welfare.-. Indeed, examples of such
anomalies appear in all of the figures ofSection III.B. The most dramatic case is in Figure 5,
where an incre^e in t from .65 to .66 caus^ EW{Nj, Tj Pj{n), R) to decrease from .3381 to
.2405, a 28.8% decline, ^ iVj increases from two^to three. ' .
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In a Bertrand industry, there is no doubt.about the direction of the misinvestment prob
lem; there is always underinvestment in the GDCRmodel (Proposition 12). However, with
Bertrand, expected profits are not monotonic in r, as Section IV showed. In particular,
ETr{N,T,^B{n)) = r • (1 —t)^~^ •Tr(l, 1) is decreasing in r for r > 1/A''. Thus, except for
rather low r (or Nb = 1), a higher value of r will tend to lower Nb^ and this indirect effect
will exacerbate underinvestment. .That is the reason for all of the downw^d jumps in the
Bertrand expected welfare curves in Figures 3, 4, 6, and 7.^^
The Cournot case in the GDCRmodel offers an even richer set of possibilities. Depending
on the parameters, expected profits may either increase or decrease in r and there may be
either over- or underinvestment. Thus, a higher value of r may either increase or decrease
Ncy and this in turn may either increase or decrease equilibrium expected welfare. Indeed,
instances can be found of all four of the logical possibilities.^ However, the magnitudes of
the expected welfare effects resulting from the changes in Nc are rather small in most cases.
This stems from the fact that the welfare magnitude of Cournot misinvestment is so often
small.
The indirect effect of R on expected welfare through a change in N is less complicated.
Higher R always lowers In a Bertrand industry or for a low probability project, such a
change in -tends to exacerbate underinvestment and thus reinforce the direct effect of R
in lowering expected welfare.
In overinvestment situations, however, a lower N has a positive effect on performance.
Thus, a higher R can also produce an anomalous effect on expected welfare. For instance,
for T > .90 in the LDCR model, the expected welfare of a perfectly collusive industry is
roughly .27 and iVj = 3 when R —.16 (Figure 5). If R increases to .17, Nj falls to two and
suchjumps appear in Figures 5 and 8 because Nb < 1 for all r for the R values in those cases.
^In Section III.B.'s examples, all of the anomalous instances of a higher r causing expected welfare to
fall are cases in which Nc falls at a point where this change creates or exacerbates underinvestment. No
instance exists in these examples of the reverse anomaly, namely a higher r causing expected welfare to fall
because of an increase in Nc' However, such an instance does exist in the LDCR model when R = .02.
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expected welfare rises to roughly .40-.41 for r in the same range. Thus, a 6.25%'increase
in research costs ca.uses a roughly 50% increase in expected-welfare, even though research
effort declines by one-third! . • . • .
Section IV showed that government policies which, lower r need not induce lower equilib
rium N and that policies which rajse T- dQ^not necessarily raise N. The results of this section
indicate that the welfare effects of such policies can also be counterintuitive. Indeed, this is
true even .when equilibrium.^ does increase with t. It is even true for changes in i?, which
are not capable of producing counterintuitive changes,in N',- '
VII. Mixeid Strategy Equilibria and Strategic Risk
.. As Section II noted, if firms in the first stage of the R&D process make their investment
decisions simultaneously, then that first stage generally has mixed strategy equilibria in
addition to the pure strategy equilibria studied so far. This section explores the expected
welfare performance in such mixed strategy equilibria.
The economic relevance of mixed strategies'in this ihodd is that they add another di
mension of risk to the R&D process: -In the pure'strategy analysis, a firm faces a risk that its
own research will fail; if it succeeds, its payoff tSen also depends on how many other firms
have succeeded. The sourceof both of these risks is-technological and is represented by the
parameter r. j . ^
'When firms invest in the first stage according to rhixed'strategies, then each firmi faces
the additional risk'that too'many "other firms will invest. Formally, iV" becomes a random
variable, and a firm which invests can no longer beconfident that E7r(N, r, P{n)) —Rwill be
nonnegative.^ One might call this the "strategic" risk of the R&D process, since it depends
on the realizations of firms' mixed strategies rather than on the re<ilizations of their research
^^The notation is as before: the expectation here is taken only over n, the number of fir^ which succeed.
Ofcourse, even ifN turns out to be large and E-k{N, t, /?(n)) < 'R, it maystUl be the case that the realized
n will be small and that those n firms will realize positive net profits.,
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efforts.
The welfare analysis is complicated by the fact that there are usually an infinitenumberof
mixed strategy equilibria. Specifically, suppose that Nx is the number offirms from industry
X which invest in the pure strategy equilibrium for a given project and that Nx > I. Then,
for any jV > TVjf, there is a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium with up to Af firms
potentially investing.
To see this, note first that, for a firm to invest with mixed strategy probability p € (0,1)
in equilibrium, that firm's expected net profits conditional on investing must be exactly
zero. The expectation in this calculation is taken over the realizations of both N and n. In a
symmetric equilibrium, if the strategy of each of the A/' firms in industry X is to invest with
(equal and independent) probability p, then a given firm's conditional-on-investing expected
profit requirement is
^ -
where £7r{iV, r,^x(")) is defined in (3).
The equilibrium value of p of course depends on A/", as well as on r, ii, and I3x(n).
Suppose that Af > Nx >1. Ifp = 0, then the left side of (20) is Ei:(liT,0x{n)), which is
greater than or equal to R because Nx > 1. On the other hand, if p = 1, then the left side
is E7r{J^\T^l3x{n)), which is less than R because > Nx- The left side of (20) is ofcourse
continuous in p and can be shown to be decreasing in p by a first order stochastic dominance
argument. Thus, a value of p 6 (0,1) exists which satisfies (20) exactly.'^ ®
The ex ante expected welfare from such a mixed strategy equilibrium is
-E ^Cn-p" -{l-pf-" •EW{N,T,h{ri),R), • (21)
where EW{N^t^0x{''^)'>R) is defined in (7).
"^^It can also be shown by stochastic dominance arguments that the equilibrium p is decreasing in but
is higher for more collusive industries for any given M,
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To compare expected welfare quantitatively between,mixed, and pure strategy equilibria,
we need to choose a particular value of One, way to,choose Af .would beto extrapolate our
research model a bit by assuming that ^.do r^earch a; firm needs,to have both theparticular
research idea and some general technological competence in the relevant manufacturing area.
It would then be economically natural toilet be the^ total number offirms which; possess
that general technological competence. Both to emphasis the_ effect of strategic-risk, and to
be consistent with our general analysis of free entry at the.-research, stage/-let J\f be, large—
much larger than Nx for any r for the giyen value of R.'^ ^ For the parameter values used in
the examples of Section IIl.B, Af •= 50 computationally^ qualifies as "large."
' Figure 15 here; '^ - ' '
Figure.15: Mixed Strategy ExpectedWdfai:e in the LDCR Model with i2= 0.04
and TV = 50 ,, ;
Figure 15 shows the nuxed strategy equilibrium iexpected welfare curvra for the.Bertrand,
Cournot, and joint profit m^inuzing industries in the, LDCR model when. R = .04 and
^ ~ 50* .(As always, the top curve is the first-best benchinark.)^ When these curves are
compared with the pure strategy values shown in Figure 3, several conclusions arise. First,
the relative performance comparisons among the.thr^.industry-typ^ a^^ the sanie'as for the
pure strategy case: Bertrand and Cqurnot^expect^ welfare values, are not-too far below the
first-best, are rpughly equal to each otherj.and^are. vastly higher-than-the expected welfare
value for perfect collusion (except.at very low values,oft). -.t,'
Second, if one compwes the mixed .stjategy expected,welfare for^ ^ch industry with that
industry s pure strategy expected ,welfare,, it appears that the .mixed-strategy values are
generally lower, but not unifornJy. so.^^, I think the explanation for the generally lower
mixed strategy values h^ to do with the fact th^,.for these industries in the LDCR model,
^^IfW <Nx, then the only equilibrium would be mpure'strategies.with all A/* firms.ihvesting.
For a counterexample, compare the Bertrand curves at the highest values of r.
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EW{N,T^/3x(n)y R) is concave in N. Now, going to a mixed strategy equilibrium is not
a mean-preservmg spread in the-distribution of N; i.e., p •M is not equal to the pure
strategy equilibrium N, nor is it a constant with respect to changes in //. However, it turns
out numerically that p •Af is not too far from constant, so that a second order stochastic
dominance effect is likely to explain a large part of the welfare change. In short, the effect
of the strategic risk" associated with mixed strategy equilibria is in this case to enlarge the
deviation from the first-best outcome.
Other values of R in the LDCR model produce similar comparisons and conclusions.
Finally, note that there are no discontinuities in the mixed strategy equilibrium expected
welfare curves. The reason is that these curves are computed holding fixed. Recall from
Section VI that the discontinuities in the pure strategy welfare curves occur at points where
the equilibirium N changes.
VIII. Patents, Profits, and Performance
So far I have assumed that effective patent protection is not available. In this section, I
examine how the availability of patent protection would affect the number of firms under
taking R&D and the industry's expected welfare performance.'^
Modifying the model toaccommodate patenting is not hard. The first stage ofthemodel,
in which investment and research take place, is unchanged. Let n again be the number of
firms which succeed at the technical aspects ofresearch. With patenting, however, only the
first firm to succeed gets to produce the new product. The assumption herewill be that each
of the n winners has an equal chance of being first. If n > 1, the realized industry profit is
then the monopoly profit, 7r(l, I). Let ETrQ{N^ r) be the expected gross profits per firm, with
patenting, given N and r. Then, since ex cinte each of the N investing firms is symmetrically
situated, the expected profits of each are 1/A'" of the expected industry profits, or, analogous
^^Recall that, in the model here, imitation is assumed to beboth slow and costly. If, at the other extreme,
imitation were costless and immediate, patent protection would be essential to generating any R&D activity.
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to (3), , •. r • •• - .
nsl , .. ' i' ' iV - '
Let the equilibrium number of firms investing be-A'i), a number which is determined by the
obvious analog to (4).,. .... • ' r j- r , , i . -h
The effect of pa^nt protection on .the number- of firms doing R&D is determined by
cpmparing the expected, profits,with'and without patenting.'^ '* Acompari^n oiF (3) and (22)
. reveals thatihow n-x(n,/3(n)): behaves as a function of n is the crucial issiie. The following
- propositon then follows.irnmediately from Lemma l(ii)7'':• '
Proposition 14. Fot any industryX in the GDGC vriodel aridfor any'N^>'2, £7ro(A^,r) >
E'ir(NyT^^x{'^ )) if,the new technology exhibUsJncreastng jvtums to,scale throughout the rel
evant output range. The same is true of projects with constant returns ifPx(n) is strictly
, decreasing ov^r some range ofn <.N.. However, ETro{N,T) k- ETr{W,T',0x{n))'if the new
technology exhibits decreasing returns and the indust^ is perfectly collusive (i.e.,, ifX.= J).
Equation (8) implies that patent protection will also decrease'R&D incentives for an industry
-that is s6mewhat4ess than perfectly collusive if retiirns' to scale in' thb new technology are
Vsufficiently decreasing « Of course, if £;:ro(7V,-r) >--^:r(iV;r;^^(n))'foraU>^;then>0 >
and No < Nx if E7ro(N,T) < Eir{N,Tjx{n)) for all N '^ •• - ' '
These.findings have several-'interes'ting-implicatibris';-'First, patent protection may in a
. ..sense be.said to favor the develbpiherit-of iricreasing Teturns techholo^esr' such prdtection
comparability,-it is assumed that.the period of patent^rotectioriis'as longM the second stage would
be without patenting. Alonger period of patent protection would obviously tend toincrease the investment
incentive.--;' ^ '.v i •
•*®As throughout, these results are based on the assumptions that only those firms which succeed at
r^wch produce and that, when there.is patent-protection/only the first-produces. Alternatively, either
with patentmg or without, the identities of the producers might be the result of post-research negotiation.
For instance, apatent holder might license other firms to produce; and,' absent patenting, multiple research
winners nught undertake production as a joint venture.
If both licensing and joint ventures were negotiable and enforceable at'reasonable t'r^actioris costs, and
Iffti allowed under antitrust laws„then the result could.be that patent protection would makele diffe^ce, to incentive. Either with or without .patenting, post-research production could be
rganized-;-dispers^d or consolidated—so as to maximize the -returns to the'firm or firms whose research
results gave them claim to the KkD rents. ^
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always increases the investment incentives for increasing returns technologies while it does
not always do so for decreasing returns technologies. Thus, the legal monopoly provided
by patent protection contributes to the development of natural monopoly technologies and,
thereby, to long-term concentration.
One standard rationale for awarding patents is that they encourage lUcD effort. However,
with slow imitation, as here, collusive conduct among multiple producers is an alternative way
in which R&D effort is induced. Proposition 14 suggests that putting these two inducements
together may sometimes backfire—that introducing the availability of legal monopoly in
an industry already characterized by "behavioral monopoly" may actually discourage RiSiD
effort in projects with decreasing returns technologies.
A related rationale for patents is to encourage "risk-taking." The model here raises a
question about how well patents fulfill this function. Comparing (3) and (22) shows that,
for the innovations considered here, patent protection is unlikely to increase R&D incentives
significantly for truly long-shot ventures. If r is very near zero, then, in both (3) and (22),
the n = 1 terms arean order ofmagnitude larger than the other terms; but, the n = 1 terms
of course are identical. Thus, the difference in expected profits between patenting and no
patenting is slight when r is very small.
The welfare effects of patenting can easily be analyzed for the GDCR model.^® With
constant returns, the realized industry profits and welfare are the same for a patent-holding
monopolist as for a perfectly collusive oligopoly. Thus, for any given r and J?, the ex ante
expected welfare and gross industry profits with patenting must equal EW(N,T,^j(n),R)
and N • E7r(JV^Tj^j(n)), respectively, for all N. Then, Nq = JVj, and the equilibrium
expected welfare under patenting is £?H^(^j,T,/?j(n),i2).
^^With constant returns, the alternative production arrangements mentioned in the preceding footnote
are irrelevant. A patent holder would have no cost reason to license and could only lose pricing discipline.
In the absence of patenting, multiple producers would gain no cost advantage from joint production. Their
maximal ability to collude is already subsumed in their schedule. Thus, the welfue conlusions offered
here need no modification for licensing or production joint ventures.
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Many of the conclusions reached^in earlier sections for the perfectly collusive case in the
GDCR model without-.patenting .can,-therefore be,immediately extended to the case with
patenting. For insteince, Proposition 11 rNvould/imply^that-with patenting there is under
investment in projects, with low .probabilities and high research costs, and overinvestment
m projects with high probabilities and low- costs.^^^ The results of Section VI imply that
expect^ welfare.under patenting usually rises with'/x^and falls with iZijbut that there may
be exceptions when a change in R or r causes No to change..
Perhaps the mpst importaiit^implications for the GDCR model are from Section III. For
projects of moderate to high probability and.for the low to moderate, values I have exam
ined, the expected welfare with patent .protection is usually below, and often, far below, the
expected welfare of either a Bertrand,ora Cournot industry without patent protection. Also,
for very .low probability, or very high cost projects, Proppsitignsbliand Simply tha,t.patent
protection would not increase and would sometimes decrease^expected welfare as compared
to any less than perfectly collusive industry without^patenting.,Only in the parameter range
identified in Proposition .4 is there theoretical support fpr expecting patent protection"' to im
prove performance; the numerical evaluations of Section III.B., however, suggest that such
an effect is generally small. . ,
, , • . > • • *f •• '• I _ :i • • •
IX. Conclusion
The main goal,of this paper has been to explore the effects of-R&D costs and success
probabilities and of the degree of ex.post.industry competition on the number of firms
which invest in R&D and on expected^welfare perform^ce. The focus-has been on the
empirically significant class ofinnovations for which imitation isdifficult, andeffective patent
protection has, for the most part, been assumed to be unavailable. A number of theoretical
results have been developed using only mild regularity assumptions about demand and'costs.
4^7This is related, to the Tandon (1983) resulti referred to in the'footnote preceding Proposition 11.
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Other theoretical results have relied on more specific assumptions about functional forms.
Numerical evaluations of functional form examples have provided additional insights. My
overall impressions of the evidence can be summarized as follows.
While firms must have some anticipation of ex post profits before they will invest in
RicD, a high degree of ex post industry collusion is generally not beneficial, especially when
the success probability of an RiS^D project is moderate to high and its costs are low. For
such a project, Bertrand and Courno't industries will usually produce much higher expected
welfare than will a joint profit maximizing industry. The reason is that perfect collusion will
yield such high expected profits that too many firms invest.
Underinvestment, on theother hand, is a significant problem for projects with low chances
of research success and high research costs. However, more anticipated collusion among mul
tiple producers still does not help very much because the problem for such projects is getting
the first firm to invest. Underinvestment is also a general problem in highly competitive in
dustries (e.g., Bertrand) but not so in industries only moderately less competitive (e.g.,
Cournot). Other than these instances, there is little evidence here to support government
subsidy of research costs.
A higher probability of research success does not always increase expected welfare, nor
does it always increase the number of firms undertaking R&D. This probability is likely to
be increased by some types of government policies and decreased by others. Either type
of policy can thus have a counterintuitive effect on R&D effort or performance or both.
Counterintuitive effects do not arise, however, for low probability projects, where an increase
in probability eilways tends to increase both investment and expected welfare.
One formulation of the model used here admits mixed strategy equilibria at the invest
ment stage. Such equilibria add the element of strategic risk (i.e., the chance that too many
firms will invest) to the technological risk of the pure strategy solution. This strategic risk
factor seems to lower expected welfare generally but not to disturb the relative performance
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rankings of Bertrand, Cournot, and perfectly collusive industries.
Finally, for this class of projects forwhich imitation is slow, patent protection, if available,
does not necessarily induce more firms to undertake R^D, nor does it necessarily increase
expected welfare even when more investment is induced. Indeed, when the new production
technology exhibits constant returns, the patent results duplicate the generally disappointing
results of a perfectly collusive industry.
. . -. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
^ ' / . <- I'v.. 1- • - . ,c • • ) .
(i) Holding n fixed and differentiating equation (1) by 0 yields
5(3 •' P(Q)-MR{Q) '' ^
' dp a
where P(Q) —'MR{Q) > 0 and
... , na (1.- %•?:!:<?). +1-miQ) - i .C"(9/n) <.a ^ ... (A2)
under the assumptions of the GDGC model. Thus, dQ/dp < 0. ' ' ' ' •
From equations (2), (5), and (6), we see that
and thus that Pr(n, ;?).depends on /? only/through Q(n,/?). .Therefore, dWfdp = (dW/dQ) •
[dQIdP) = {P(Q) - C'{Q/n)) :{dQldP). Of.course,-./'(Q) >..C'(Q/n) and strictly so if
P. > 0. Thus, W{n^P) is decreasing in /3 and-strictly/decreasing if >iO;:
Similarlyj Tr{n^P) also depends.ononlyithrough Q(ni)3).. Specifically,-57r;/5^ = (57r/5Q)
{dQIdp) = ^ •{MR(Q) —C\Qln)) •{dQjdp)-, This is obviously nbnnegative and, indeed,
. positive if 0 < 1. •_ • nc • '







where f2 is defined abovb in (A2); E^uitioiir(A4) and (A2j* show > 0, with the
inequality being strict ifP(n) is strictly decreasing in h orif C" > '^0. '' '
Totally differentiating (2) yields
dT{n\p(n)X Q , " > i ' ' '' ^ jq •





with the inequality being strict unless /?(n) = 0 and C" = 0 over the relevant ranges, per
(A4).
As for industry profit, (/[n • T(n^/3(n))]/dn = 7r(n,/?(n)) + n •dir/dn. Equation (8) then
results from substituting in from (A5) and using the fact (derivable from (1)) that MR(Q) —
C'{Qln) = (1 —/?(n)) •Q •P'[Q)- All the interpretations of (8) follow from using (A4) and
observing that [C'(Qln)~ AC(Qln)] is negative/zero/positive as returns to scale are locally
increasing/constant/decreasing.
Finally, differentiating equation (A3) above immediately yields (9), and the appropriate
interpretations follow.
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) It was assumed above that ^g(I) = /3w(l) = 1, no matter what the values of ^g{^)
and ^//(n) for n > 1. Thus, £7r(l,r,^G(n)) = £;7r(l, r,/3H(n)) = t *''"(l,!) for all r.
Therefore, £^7r(l,r,/3c7(n)) < R and Nq = 0 iff ^ = 0*
(ii) From Lemma I'we know that ?r(n,/3) is strictly increasing in ^ for < 1. Then
the assumption that industry G ismore collusive than industry H andequation (3) together
imply that E7r(N,T,^G{n)) > ET:{N,T,^H{n)) at any ^ven N, with the inequality holding
strictly if A'' > 1. Equation (4) and the fact that Et: is decreasing in N thus imply that
Ng > Nh-
I
Kit happens that Ng = Nh^ then G and H will have the same probability distributions
over outcomes n. However, Lemma 1 says that ty(n,/3G(n)) < iy(n,/3/j-(n)), with the in
equality being strict for any n > 1. Therefore, ^W(iVG,T,/3G('^ ))-^) < ^W(iV^,T,/3//(n),ii),
with strict inequality if Nq = > !•
Proof of Pro-position 1. The inequality (10) implies that Nj < 2. Since a perfectly collusive
industry is at least as collusive as any other industry, it follows from Lemma 2(ii) that
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< 2 and Nfj < 2 also. But then Lemma 2(1) implies, that either Nfj = 1 or
= Nh —0. In that case, since ^g(I) = = 1, both the probability distributions
and realized welfare outcomes are the sameior both industries. Equation (11.) follows.
: ^ . a...
Proof of Proposition 2. In the GDCR. model, .Lemma l(ii) implies .that .VK(n,^j(Ti)) =
H^(l, 1) for all n > 1. Thus,
. r " ' ?•.'--!; . ' ' J • ,
EW(N^^~l,T,pj{n),R) - EW[N,T,pj{n),R) < '• '
= {(r- (i - r)^+')".¥(i, 1) - (JV +1)4 -'{(l - (1 - r)^j; W(U1)-N-R}
= . V •. (A6)
for any A'' > 1. Note that (A6) is decreasing in N. Thus, if i2 > r •(1 —r) •H^(l, 1)—i.e., if
(A6) is negative for N'= 1—then equation (A6) is negative for all TV > 1,'and, consequently,
-• . • 'i i'V; , r ' » ' .. • i." • •
EW{No,T,0j{n),R)> EW(NuT,^j(n),R) . (A7)
for any A^i > A'o > 1. • ' j •' •I • -'Ji!
Lemma 1 implies that Nj > Nq. Then,
' '!•>." ', . - ''i -f-, • . ' •» -
EW(Na, T, 0a{n), R) > EW{Na, r,^n), R) > EW(Nj, r, R). (AS)
Lemma 2(ii) showed" the first; inequality holds, and it holds weakly only if No < 2. The
second inequality holds weakly only if Nj = Nq. The assumption that £',x(2,-,r,;?j(n)) >R
^implies that Nj > 2. Thus, at l^st one ine^u^ity in (A8) must hold-strictly, yielding (13).
Finally, to s^ that (12) r^uires (14), note,that, ^with constant returns, (8) implies that
=i- Then, E7r{2, Tjj{n)) = r -.(1 - tJ.2) •. ;r,(l, 1), so.,that ,,(,12) requires
(1 - 7/2). x(i;i)> •(! - r). W(U 1).' • (A9)
This inequality easily rearranges to give (14).
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Proof of Proposition 3. The expression r-(l-r)-W^(l,l) has amaximum value of J- '^(1,1)
achieved at r = |. Thus, when /? > J •VV(1,1), Proposition 2 holds if ETr{2,T, dj{n)) > R,
while Proposition 1holds ifthe reverse. One way or the other, equation (15) follows whatever
the value of r. Clearly then choosing J •W{1,1) would give the desired result.
If < 3^ we can do a bit better. Equation (14) would then indicate that
T- > i. Let R' = r* = E^{2,r\0j{n)). Then r -(1 - r) •W(l, 1) is
decreasing for r > r', so that R > R' would imply /? > r • (1 - r) •W{1,1) for r > r". As
above, either Proposition 1or 2 would then hold. As for r < t*, note that £7r(2, r,/3j(n)) =
r •(1 —r/2) •ff(l, 1) (see proof of Proposition 2) and is thus strictly increasing in r on [0,1].
Thus, if T < r', then E7r{2,T, /3j{n)) < R' < R and Proposition 1 holds.
Proof ofProposition 4' Note first that, as established in the discussion preceding equation
(4) and in the proof of Lenuna 2(ii), for any r, equation (16) is satisfied for all R in some
interval of positive length. For such (r^R) values Lemma 2 and equation (4) imply Aj = 2
and Nc = 1. In that case, it then follows from (7) that
EW{Nj,Tjj(n),R)-EW{NG,T,PG{n),R) = T-{l-2T)-W{l,l)W-W{2A)-R- (AlO)
Then (17) holds iff
r.(l -2r).H^(l,l) + r2. W^(2,l) > R. (All)
At r = 0, the left side of (All) is zero and its derivative with respect to r is H^(l,1). Also at
T = 0, £x(2, r,j5j(n)) = 0, and its derivative with respect to r is 7r(l,1). Thus, 3f > 0 such
that T e (0,f) implies r •(1—2r)- W^(1,1) + t^*W(2,l) > Eir{2^T,0j(n)). For these values
of r and the corresponding values of R which satisfy (AlO), inequality (All)is therefore
satisfied, and the propositon is thus established.
Proof of Proposition 5. First write the constraint as N •Eir(Nj r, 0{n)) —N ' R>0- Using
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A for the multiplier, the Lagrangian for (18) can be written as ;
\n=l / -
' < ' j . . • TI •I ' I ' ' i. - ' '
-{l + X)-N-R (A12)
For n = A, the choice of 0(k) affects both W{k^j3(k)) and :r(k,^(k)) through the determi
nation of Q in (1)—andjdoes .not affect realized profits or welfare for any. other n. Thus,







where A" is the optimal Aand all'functions are evaluated at the optimum. As in the proof
of Lemma 1, dW/dQ = P{Q) - C'(Q/k) and k •dn/dQ = MR{Q) - C'{Q/k). Then (A13)
implies
P(Q) - C'{Q/k) = -A-. {MR{Q) - C\Q/k)). (A14)
A comparison of (A14) with (1) indicates that A* = P'{k)/{1—0'(k)). Since 0/(1 —0) is
strictly increasing in this in turn implies that 0'(k) == 0' for all = 1,.. .yN'.
Proof of Proposition 6. The derivative of (3) with respect to r at r = 1 is
dETr{N,T,Px{n})
r=l
which is negative under the general condition of the proposition. Since (3) is continuously
difFerentiable in r, the existence of the required f ^follows. The sufficiency of the particular
conditions follows immediately from Lemma l(ii).
Proof of Proposition 7. Since 0-:r(0,/9;f) = 0, the general condition of the proposition implies
that the function n •?r(n,^x(*i)) is nondecreasing at all n and strictly.increasing at some n
in the support of the outcome distribution. Since Pr(n < n' \ ,/V,r) is decreasing in r for
= iV . ^{Njx{N)) -{N-l) - 1)), (Alo)
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all n' < N, &cumulative distribution with a higher r parameter first order stochastically
dominates one with a lower r. The claimed result is then implied by Hanoch and Levy's
(1969) Theorem i. (See Tesfatsion (1976) for further discussion of H-L's theorem.) The
sufficiency of the particular conditions follows immediately from Lemma l(ii).






The proposition then follows because Eir(N,T^lSx{n)) is continuously difFerentiable in r.
Proof of Proposition 10. If r < i?/VV(l,l), then = 0 for any market industry (i.e.,
where /^^(l) = 1) the proposition is obvious. Assume here that r > R/W{ly 1), so that
A''^ > 1. For TV" > 1, define the expected welfare contribution of the A''^ ^ investment in
industry X as AEW{N^Tj^x(''^)tP-) = EW{N^Tj^x('^)j R) ~ EW(N —l^Tj0x{n)^R). It
is straightforward to show that
AEW(N,Tjx{n\R)= (A17)
•^{EN-iC„ •r" •(1 - •{W{n+l,fe(n+1)) •- lV(n„&(n)))| -R
Equations (9) and (A4) imply W[n\Pj{n)) = W(l, 1) for all n > 1. This means that
only the n = 0 term in (A17) is positive for A" = J:
AEW[N, r, /3j(n), R) = t-{\- •W{1,1) - R. (A18)
This expression is decreasing in N for N I. If Nj > 1, then it must be the case that
AEW(N],T,^j{n),R) > 0, which in turn indicates that AEW(N,t,Mt^)^^) > 0for all N
such that I < N < Nj.
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For all market industries Xy Vi^(lj;5x{l)) = W(lvl) and VV{n,(n)) is nondecreasing
in n in the G.DCR model. Then, for any particular industry G, we can-.see from (AIT)
that AEW{N,T^^j{n)yR) > 0_ implies^^£;VK(iV, 7;, ^G(n),/i) .> 0. (The n = 0 terms are
the same for both industries, and the n >^0 terms are nonnegative for the G case.) Thus,
EW{NjT^G(n)j R) is nondecr^sing in ,N at least up to 'N = Nj. This implies, that Nq >
'V it,' » •-
In the first-best case, li''(n,0) = 1 for all n > 0. Then, EW{N^T^^"(n),R) = 1 -
(1 - r)^ - N- R and AEW{N,T,l3"{n),R) = t • (1 - - R for all > 1. Thus,
AEW{N^T^l3j(n)^ R) > 0 impli^ AEW{Ny r,0"(n)yR) > 0. As .before, this implies that
N" > N].
, r — i' I
Proof of Proposition 11. The proofs of this^ and-some later propositions will make use of the
following lemma.
• Lemma A1. For all s € (0,1), all of the following hold:
'-log(r-5)' > a,' • ' (A19)
—log(l —3) < s/Vl - s, and , ^ , (A20)
-log(l-5) < s/{l-s). (A21)
~ - ' '' j •
Both (A19) and (A21) are immediate from theTaylor expansion (with Lagrange remainder)
of log(l —5) about 3 = 0. To establish (A20), note that both sides are zero at s = 0. The
derivative of"the left side can readily be shown to;be stricly less than that of the right for
0 < 3 < 1.
I
For the underinvestment results of both parts (i) and (ii) (i.e., the Nq < Nq results), it
suffices to show that the conditions implyunderinvestihent for a perfect collusive industry
and then to invoke Proposition 10.
";j 'li: ;• i i'
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Proof of part (i): Since R < 7r(l,l) < 1^(1,1), equation (A18) and the subsequent
discussion imply that iVj = 1 at r = 1. If = 7r(l, 1), then = 0 for r < 1 and iVj = 1 '
for r = 1. Thus, for R = ;r(l, 1) we must choose tq = 1.
Henceforth, let R < ;r{l,l). Then Nj is still zero if r < i2/7r(l,l). Thus, if we can
choose a To € [/l/x(l, 1),1] that satisfies the proposition for all t in that interval, then the
same tq will work for all t € 0,1]. The rest oftheproof considers cases where r > R/ir{l, 1)
and therefore Nj > I.
With constant returns, n •7r(n,^y(n)) = t(1, 1) for all n > 1, per Lemma 1. Thus, for a
perfectly collusive industry, the equilibrium condition (4) requires
^~ ^ ^~ (A22)
Define Nj (not necessarily an integer) to satisfy
1_ fl _ r)^j
= (A23)
Since (l—(1 — /N is strictly decreasing in Nand converges to zero, when T-7r(l, 1) >R,
such an Nj exists, it is at least unity, and Nj =
From (A18) it is clear that, if TVj > 1, it satisfies
r . (1 - . IV(1, l)>R>r-(l-T)^^- IV(1,1). (A24)
Define iVJ = 1 if r = 1, and, for r < 1, let Nj be defined implicitly by
r . (1 - . W(l, 1) = R. (A25)
Then, for r 6 [i2/7r(l,1), 1),
(R-{1-t)\
•48 [zj is the greatest integer less than or equal to 2.
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Note that the ex^r^sion on the right side,of (A26) is continuous-in r. on [i2/7r(rl, 1), 1) and
converges to unity frbrn above as r converges to,one, from below. It should.be clear from the
preceding discussion that = [iVjJ for all.r G].R/7r(l,.l), 1]. .
It is easily shown that Nj > N] implies Nj > N] and that.TVj < implies Nj < N].
Thus, our desired result will appear if we canrestablish the appropriate inequaltit^ between
and A'} over appropriate,ranges of.T.. j
The expression (l —(1 —r)^y-7r(l, 1)/^ being strictly decreasing in N, if this expression
can be shown to be greater than (equal toy-(less than) .JZ.at 'JV = iVj, then (A23)"implies Nj
is greater than (equal to) (less than) Nj. It is equivalent to show that
(l - (1 - rf^) t(1, 1) - NJR (A27)
^ 'j. . " ' •;< j. r - I ' v • l '' • *
is greater than (equal to) (less than) zero. When r = 1, this expression has the value
.L,
497r(l, 1)—J? > 0. When t < 1, we can substitute (A26) to get
T(l,lj _(1 r'f)-. Rf •L-Zlog(^|) \ ,. ;.r-Wa,l)J ""[logil-T) )•
Note that (A28) converges to ^(r/l) —Ras r converges'to one, so that (A'27) is continuous
in r for r €jiE/7r(l, 1), 1]. / : r,.-
' -- i" ^
•At T = i2/7r(l, 1), the value of (A28) is
H'Ci.l) V l°s (i - J
."t .i ' ji"' ''•.'ij r.o • *. ,'
(A28)
(A29)
< 1) •f-1 ^ )-R.C'l + T(M))'|
= 0,
r..*iJ' 1j• I ui. i .:
. 1" I. •>. .
where the inequality is formed by using (A19) to substitute for Iog(?r(l, 1)/W(1,1)) and
(A21) to. substitute for ,log(l - (ii/:r(l, 1))), in- (A29). Since (A27) is continuous in r, is
'^ ®Use is made of the identity j/iost")/ 'osfv) = a. - ,
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n^ative at r = i2/7r(l,l), and is positive at r = 1, if it can be shown to be strictly
increasing in t, then there will be a unique value of t 6 (i2/7r(l, 1),1)—call it tq—at which
(A27) will be zero. For r < tq, (A27) will be negative and Nj < N} For r > tq, (A27) will
be positive and Nj > A'J.
Thus, to complete the proof, we need only show that the partial derivative of (A28) with
respect to r is positive for r € (i2/r(l, 1),1)- That derivative is
'°8 (tto) ^
1^(1.1)•2 .
-R I U.tVd.i) j
*^{iy(\ ~ --r))^ +^(1 -r) log(l -r) -
(1 - - ^)Y +(1 - - r))^,1^(1









where T=R-r"' •(1 —r)~^ •(log(l —t)^ > 0. The expression in curled braces on the




The last square bracketed term on the right side is nonnegative when r > i2/;r(l,l). The
second is positive per (A19). The first can also be shown to be positive by using (A19) to
substitute for log(T(l, 1)/W(1,1)) and using (A20) to substitute for (1 —T)(log(l —T)j .
Finally, at r = 1, £x(2, l,^j(n)) = 5r(l,l)/2 > R implies that Nj > 2. This in turn
implies that AO > = 1 at r = 1.
Proof of part (ii): The same style of proof is used here as was used in part (i). If
R> T•)r(l,1), then Nj = 0. Thus, if we can choose an i2o € (0, r •7r(l, 1)] that satisfies
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the proposition for all R in that interval, then,.the same Ro will work for all R > 0. The
remainder of the proof addresses cases for which R < t •7r(l, 1).
Take first the case of r = 1. As argued above, iVj.is theniunity. Choose R^ = 7r(l,l).
Then R < R^ implies > 1 = N]. j
Henceforth, .assume r < 1. What I,will show is that (A28) is positive in the limit as
R goes to zero, negative at i2 = r •7r(l, 1), and strictly decreasing,in between. The above
relationships aniong iVj, /Vj, and NJ would.then imply the claimed result.
As R goes to zero, the value of (A28) goes to 7r(l, 1) > 0, since lim/j_o+(-'2*log-^) = 0 by
L'HopiteJ^s rule. On the other hand, substituting R = t •^(1,1') produces a negative value
in (A28), just as when we substituted^^ ^/7r(l, 1) in (A29). Finally, the partial derivative
of (A28) with respect to R on (0,t •7r(l^ 1)) is
. .log(l-r)iw log(l.^;r). w. ..v - . ;
• (l-r).-..T(l;l) ' . log(ji/(r.T(l.l))) ••log(T(l,l:)/Ty(l,l)) -l
. • '"SU-j) .. . ' A°g(l-'•).. • log(;l-'")
(1 - r) •y(l,.l). \og{R/(;T •t(-1, p)) .l:- t(1, 1)/W(.1,1.) • 1
r-lV(l,l) Ipg(l-r) t/(1-t) t
lQg(it/(TT(l,l)))
log(l-r)
The first inequality is generated by again using parts of Lemma Al.^ This completes the
proof of the proposition. . , ,
It is ofinterest to note how Tq, as chosen here, is affected by changes in R and, conversely,
how i2o is. affected by changes in r.^ For agiven R, rp- is- chosen as the value of r which makes
expression (A28) equal to zero. For, a given r, ^ is likewise defined as. the value of Rwhich
makes the san^e expression zero. Thus, drofwill be. ^ual to the negative of the ratio of
the partial derivatives of (A28) with respect to. R and r (respectively), and^dRo/dT will be
the reciprocal ratio. These partial derivatives are of opposite signs (see (A30) and (A32)).
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Thus, both dTojdR and dR^ldT are positive.
Proof of Pivposition 12. The cases in which r < ii/7r(l,l) are covered by Proposition 9.
Assume here that r > ;i/7r(l,l). Recall that, in the GDCR model, jr(n,/?B(n)) is ;r(l,l)
when n = 1and is zero when n > L Also, W{n,^B(n)) is W(l, 1) when n = 1and is unity
when n > 1. Thus, for Af > 1, ET(N,T,^B{n)) = t •(1 - •Jr(l,l). For = r = 1,
AEW{N, T, R) = VK(1,1) —iJ, while for other values of r and N
AEW{N,T,h(n),R)= , (A33)
T•(1 - r)''-'. W[\, 1) + (A^ - 1). . (1 - Tf-'^. (1 _ VV(1,1)) _ R.
The assumption r > 1) implies Nb > 1. By definition of Nb, Eh{Nb, t, Pain)) > R,
which implies E'KiN, r,^B(n)) > Rfor all Nsuch that \ < N < Nb- Since U^(l, 1) > 7r(l, 1),
for any given N > I, Ev{N,T,PB[n)) > R implies AEW{N,r,^B{n),R) > 0. Thus,
AEW(N,T,/3B(n),R) > 0 for all N such that 1< N < Nb, and Ng > Nb-
Given this, we can conclude that Ng > Nb ifwe can show theexpected welfare contribu
tion of the (Nb +1)®' investment is positive; that is, that AEW{Nb + l,r,/3fl(n),i?) > 0.
Note that
AEW{Nb + = (A34)
•"'''la,?''"'} -«
The desired result thus follows if the expression in curled braces is greater than or equal to
one. This expression is a convex combination of (vr(l, 1)/^(1,1)), which exc^s one, and
' (1 ~ !))• Condition (i) implies the latter is also at least one.
At r = 1, Nb = 1 and the right side of (A34) is 1 —IV(1,1) —iZ, so that (ii) is also
sufficient.
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In the LDCR model, 7r(l, 1) = ^ and 1—W{1,1) = Thus, for that model, condition
(iii) guarantees condition (i). The IDCR part of (iii) is established.in the same way. Since (v)
will be shown to hold even,for = 1, here we needonly show that 2-(l-1^(1,1)) > Jr(l,l)
when c < -2. In the IDCR model, 1 - Vr(l,l) = 1 and;7r(l„l) =
Substituting these expressions and r^rranging yields an equivalent sufficient condition
2^(4T)°-'"Prr)^o-'" ' • ' (ASS)\e + 1/ \ e + 1 / ^ ^
\
The expression becomes niore manageable if we substitute x = —(e + 1). With some rear
ranging, the new condition^then ^becomes. . . „ r ,,
Taking logarithms yields tHe equivalent condition
log(2) + (x+ 1) •log(x + 1) - X•log(x) - log(5x + 2) > 0. (A37)
, '.j-i
The range e < —2 corresponds to the range x > 1. It can be shown that as x goes to infinity
the left side of (A37) goes to 1+ log(2/5) as 0.0837.^THe derivative ofthe left side is of(A37)
.\o -f+11^ , 53: +2 .. ^(x.+ \)x • 5?+;2' (A38)
•where the siinpIification _uses^(A20). The right side'of A38 can be shown to be negative for
..X > 1. Since the left side of.(A37) is thus strictly decreasing• for x > 1' and positive in the
limit, it niust.be positive for all X> 1; , ' " i
Consider, condition (iv). .In light of (iii), the only case that needs to be checked is where
A'b = 1."We need then.'to.show that' ^ . .j •
4£Ty(2,T,^B(n),i2) =r. [(1-r). l +T-i]' (A39)
IS nonnegative. Here Nb - 1 implies,that r- jr(l, l),.=,>r • i > i2.,,Then, if t < i, the
square-bracketed term in (A39) is at least one-h^f, and-the desired result follows. Now
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suppose that R < For this case, we need only look at r G 1], since r < i is sufficient
for any R. With (A39) being concave in r, the minimum of that expression as a function
of r on [j, 1] occurs at one or both end points. In fact that minimum value turns out to be
^ and the desired result holds.
Condition (v) is validated if it can be shown to imply 1— > ;r(l,l) for all
c € —2,—l). Substituting as above shows that this implication is equivalent to
/ 2\ ^
1 > 3 + -
V e/ (tttJ •
Let X_ (e + 1), so that x—1if e——2 and x= 0if e= —1. Substituting for e in (A40)
yields the equivalent condition
/ 2 \ / X1 > (3_ ^ ^ ^V x+1/ ^x +l)
for all XG(0,1]. This is in turn equivalent to
(x + 1) •log(x + 1) - X•log(x) - Iog(3x + 1) > 0 (A42)
for the same range of x. It can be shown that the left side of (A42) is concave for x 6 (0, |)
and convex for x 6 Therefore, for x € (OjDj the left side must be greater than the
lesser ofits value at x = | and its limit as x goes to zero. The latter value, by L'Hopital's
rule, is zero, while the former is | •log(2) —log(3) « 0.05663. Thus, the desired condition
holds for X€ (0,5]. At x = 1, the derivative of the left side of (A42) is log(2) —f —.05685.
Since the left side of (A42) is convex on (5,1), the derivative of that left side must be
negative for thewhole interval. Thus, the left side, which is positive at x = 5, zero at x = 1,
and monotonically decreasing in between, must be nonnegative on [|, 1]. This establishes
condition (v).
Proof of Proposition 13, When r ss 1, in the IDCR model with e = —2, direct calcu
lation shows that EW{N^l,j3c{n),R) = 1 — —NR (which is concave in N) and
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that Er(N,lJc{n)) = \(2N - l)N-\ For N = I, AEW{\,1,0c{n), R) = | - ^2,
while, for > 1, AEW{N,l, (3c(n), R) = \{2N - 1)N-^{N - l)-^ - R. At N =
AEW{N^1^0c{'^ )^R) ^ 0 > AEW{N + 1, l,^c(")i-R)! which here implies | > ^ if
N — 1 and
2N-1 „ 2N + 1
- > TTTTV'^ ^72 (A43)4 . A^2 . (TV - 1)2 - " ' 4 • (A^ + 1)2 . yV2
if iV > 2. On the other hand, (4) implies that at yV = Nc
2N-\ ^ ^ 2N-\-l
47V3 -^4-(iV +l)3' ^ '
Direct calculation shows that Nc = 1 when j ^ ^ ~ 2 when ^ > R >
Also, Nc = 1 when | > i? > ^, and N^ = 2 when ^ > R> This verifies (I-i), (I-ii),
and (I-iv). If iZ < then Nc > 3. When > 3, it can be shown that
2N-¥l ^ 2N-1 ,,,,,
^ /.r (A45)4. (AT+ 1)3 - 4•A^2.(A^-l)2•
Thus, when (A44) is satisfied by Nc > 3 for a given R, that Nc is too large to satisfy (A43).
In the LDCR model, EW{Nj l,/3cr(n)) = 1—(iV + 1)"^—NR (which is concave in
N), while E-:r{N,l,0c(n)) = 2(A^+ 1)"^ Again, at TV = N^, AEW(NXM^IR) > 0 >
AEW{N lyl, l3c(n),R), which here implies
2;.+ ! 2iV.,3
iV2.(iV + l)2 - - (TV+ 1)2. (AT+ 2)2*
On the other hand, (4) implies that at A'' =
{N +1)2 - ^ ^ {N +2y
Direct calculation shows that A^c = 1when §> iZ > § and A^c = 2when | > iZ > |. Also,
Nq = 1 when f ^ and Nq = 2 when ^ > i2 > This verifies (L-i) and (L-ii)
and shows that (L-iii) holds for the other cases where Nc is less than 3. For any iV > 3, it
can be shown that 2(Ar + 2)-= > (2A^ + 1)A^-2(A^ + l)-2. Thus, when (A47) is satisfied by
Nc>3 for a given R, that Nc is too large to satisfy (A46).
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Table 1; Linear Demand-Constant Returns (LDCR) Model





1/2, if n = 1
0, if n > 1
3/4, if n = 1
1, if n > 1
Couraot /5c(n) 2(n+l)a (n+l)a




Table 2: Isoelastic Demand-Constant Returns (IDCR) Model
Oligopoly Solution Tr{n,0(n)) W{n,^(n))
General 0(n) /5(n).fe+l)\ / e y^+l)\ ne J U+^(n)/
//3(nHe+l)+eA f e
V e J \e+0{n)J
Bertreind 0b(^)
(4i) > 1
0, if n > 1 1, if n > 1
Cournot ^(n)
\ ne J \ne+lj





















Figure 1: Values of r and R for Propositions 1—4: LDCR Model
































Figure 3: Expected Welfare for the LDCR Model with R = 0.04




















Figure 5: Expected Welfare for the LDCR Model with R = 0.16


























Figure 7: Expected Welfare for the IDCR Model with e = -2 and R = 0.04












Figure 9: The Optimal 0 for the LDCR Model
























Figure 11: Equilibrium and Optimized Investment Expected Welfare:
Perfect Collusion with R = 0.08
Figure 12: Bertrand Equilibrium and Optimized Investment Expected Welfare






















Cournot Equilibrium and Optimized Investment Expected Welfare
with R — 0.04 in the LDCR Model
Cournot Equilibrium and Optimized Investment Expected Welfare
















Figure 15: Mixed Strategy Expected Welfare in the LDCR Model with R = 0.04
and AT=s 50
